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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines the possible outcomes of U.S. Navy policies to achieve 
proportionru representation of blacks in enlisted occupations. This thesis employs two 
models to anruyze the distribution of black enlisted men in the Navy's occupational 
speciruties. The fIfst model uses FY 1979, FY 1982. FY 1985, and FY 1988 cohort data to 
examine black male occupational representation during the fifth year of service. This study 
introduces a new approach to control for the influence of aptitude test scores on the 
occupational placement process. Black male representation in 14 occupational categories 
comprising J09 Navy ratings is graphically summarized using difference indicators. The 
study analyzes the trend in black ma1e representation by comparing difference indicators 
for four enlisted cohorts spanning a 14-year period. The second model uses data on the 
1991 Navy enlisted population and the 1992 census to compare the distribution of black 
men in Navy ratings with the distribution of black men in civilian occupations. The results 
of the study reveal that disproportionate representation persists in certain Navy ratings. 
However, when the influence of aptitude is controlled. results indicate that the Navy has 
made progress toward minority placement goals. The study suggests that U.S. Navy 
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I. INTROD UCTION 
A. BA CKGROUND 
If the Navy is to attain its goals for military readiness in an era of voluntary service, it 
is important that it make the most effective use of its personnel. National population 
projections of draft-age youth through the year 2000 indicate that, while the military age 
population (18-26) is declining, the percentage of African-Americans, or blacks, in the 
population is increasing [Rd. l :p. 82-100]. If the Navy is to successfully recruit and 
employ its share of qualified draft-age youth. it is important that it be perceived as an equal 
opportunity, nondiscriminatory organization. 
The Navy Affrrmative Action Plan (NAA P) is the foundation of the Navy's program 
to ensw-e equal opponunity. A primary goal of the NAA P is to" .. . attain a minority en listed 
population that as a minimum reflects the percentages of minorities i.n the general 
population." [Ref. 2:p. 8] Since the inception of the AU-Volunteer Force (AYF) in 1973. 
black representation in the armed forces has grown steadily. By 1983, the Navy achieved 
its overall representation goal for blacks and has exceeded the goal every year since. 
Another goal of the NAAP.ciosely related to the firs t and more relevant to this thesis, 
mandates that. '". within legal constraints. minorities and women participate equitably in 
all occupational areas and warfare specialties." [Ref. 2:p. I] This study examines the degree 
to which this goal has been achieved for the enl isted force. The study foc uses on the 
appropriate methods to measure "equitable participation," pertinent factors affecting 
attainme nt of the goal of equitable represent.1tion across occupational specialties, and the 
relevant implications for the Navy of alternative policies to achieve this goal. 
Despite the Navy's relative "success" in attaining and exceeding its goals for overall 
representation of biacks. it is well-documented that blacks are not proportionately 
represented across the military's occupational specialties. For example, the 1992 Navy 
Equal Opportunity Assessment listed the ren most overrepresented and underrepresented 
Department of Defense (000) occupational groupings for minorities over several years. 
Representation was detennined using overall minority percentages (in the Navy) as a basis. 
Fiscal 1990 information, converted to Navy rating equivalents, is displayed in Table 1 
[Ref. 3]. Despite the report's aggregation of all racial and ethnic groups into a single 
TABLE 1. MINORITY REPRESENTATION IN SELECTED NAVY ENLISTED RATINGS: THE 
FIYE MOST OYER-REPRESENTED RATINGS AND THE FIVE MOST UNDERREPRESENTED 




DoD_Group""""""", NavyRatiog Mlnorityt ........... 
84 Personal Service SK 60.6 106.7 
54 Accounting, Finance & Disbursing DK 52.4 78.7 
80 Food Service MS 51.1 74.2 
33 Dental Care DT 47.9 63.' 
55 Other Functional Support AK,SK 47.9 63.' 
--
........ PeI'centUnder-
DoD Occupational Group De8Crlption. Navy Rating Minority ............. 
21 Sonar ST 8.5 -71.1 
45 Musician MU lnl -65.6 
11 Fire Contol Technician Fr, Fl'G, Fe 11' -60.1 
19 Other Electronics Equipment ET 12.3 -58.1 
10 Radio/Radar AT, ET, FC 12.' ·56.0 
Source: [Ref. 41. 
t"Mioority"is dellnedas any non-wmte. 
Percent overrepresented and percent underrepresented is determined using the Minority Representa-
lion I~ (MRI):.MR.I. [(Acwal Number + Expected Number) x 100] . 100. Where Expected 
NWlber is equal totbe total in tbeoccupation multiplied times lbeoveral.lpercentageofminorities in 
tbepopulmion[Ref.4]. 
minority category and the difficulties of convening DoD occupational codes to Navy 
ratings, one can readily conclude that significant differences in representation exist across 
these ratings. 
In 1988, the Chief of Naval Operations (eND) commissioned a special Study Group 
on Equal Opportunity in the Navy. In its first report to CNO, the group stated that one goal 
of the Navy's Affmnative Action Plan should be to optimize minority upward mobility 
through an equitable distribution of minority enlisted personnel among all ratings and 
occupational field. The fiscal 1992 Equal Opportunity Assessment reponed that minority 
representation remains unevenly distributed across the Navy rating structure and that 
minorities continue to be underrepresented in the more technical ratings rRef.31. 
Although to date the Navy has established no specific minority representation goals 
for individual ratings, the Equal Opportunity Assessment evaluates "equitable 
representation" on the basis of each racial or ethnic group within the Navy at the end of a 
particular fiscal year. For example, at the end of fiscal 1991 blacks accounted for 17.6 
percent of the total Navy enlisted force [Ref.5]. Therefore, the expectation implied by the 
Equal Opportunity Assessment is that the proportion of blacks within each individual rating 
should also approximate 17.6 percent. The implied assumption appears to be that the 
distribution of racial/ethnic groups would be equal in the absence of some fonn of 
institutional bias acting against a particular minority. This assumption, however, is 
somewhat naive because it appears to give little or no weight to important factors such as 
qualifications and personal preferences. Thus far, little research has been conducted that 
measures racial differences in occupational preferences. However, differences in 
occupational qualification rates are easily quantified and well-documented. 
B. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
This thesis examines the effectiveness of the U.S. Navy's affirmative action program 
in achieving a proportional distribution of black men in the enlisted ranks. llris study uses 
two models to analyze the expected distribution of black enlisted men among the Navy's 
occupational specialties. The frrst model examines the influence of aptitude test scores on 
representation in enlisted occupations at the fifth year of military service for non-prior 
service (NPS) bLack and non-blackl male enlistees within a particular cohort. To establish 
trends in representation, the model is applied to four separate cohorts consisting of enlisted 
personnel who entered the Navy in fiscal 1979, 1982, 1985, and 1988, respectively. A 
procedure to control for the influence of aptitude tests scores is introduced and explained. 
Graphical depiction of black male representation in Navy enlisted occupations is shown by 
cohort and enlisted commwrity. This model draws on data resources from the Navy's 
Active-Duty Master files, Active-Duty Accession files, and standardized tests scores from 
the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB). The study explores the 
relationship of disproportionate occupational representation and black advancement rates 
by examining cohort data over the course of several years. 
The second model compares the distribution of black men by occupation in the Navy 
with the distribution of black men in comparable civilian occupations. This calculation uses 
1991 data from Current Population Surveys and a 1992 cross-sectional file of all Navy 
enlisted personnel. 
C. ORGANIZATIONOFTHESTUDY 
This study is organized into five chapters. The next chapter reviews pertinent studies 
and other literature that relate to occupational placement of minorities in the anned forces. 
Chapter III addresses occupational representation when the influence of aptitude is 
controlled. It begins with an examination and assessment of the methodology used in a 
previous study that evaluates occupational representation after attempting to control for the 
influence of aptitude. Chapter III also describes the contents of the data files and the 
research methodology used by an alternative approach introduced in this study as the 
"Assignment Model." Chapter III concludes with the results of the Assignment Model. 
Chapter IV describes the contents of the data files, explains the research methodology, and 
IThe IeTI1l "non-black" refen; to all mdal/ethnic groups ill the popu1ation, including "whites" and all OthCT 
minorities not categorized a<l black. 
pT()\ide~ the re.~ull' from this study's sel:ond model. \\hiL'11 COlllr~e~ f:1V11JrHl and Navy 
occupalJonal dJ'(JJbutions. Chapter V summarizes til<:> re~ull" offer, LonduslOn~ drawn 
trom the findmg\, and provides recommendations deJived from the re\t'JfLh ction 
R BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
This chapter reviews literature related 10 the occupational placement of minorities in 
the anned services. To gain a perspective on present issues, Section A provides a brief 
history of black representation in the Navy. Section B examines the occupational 
assignment process and describes the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery 
(ASV AB). Section C reviews literature that explores differences in the perfonnance of 
blacks and non-blacks on aptitude tests and the fairness of aptitude tests in detennining 
occupational placement. Section D examines affirmative action programs and policies in 
the Navy. The final section (E) looks at the literature on the occupational placement of 
minorities in the armed services. 
A. BLACKS IN THE U.S. NAVY: A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
1. Days of Sail 
Black Americans have been members of the nation's Navy since its inception. 
During the colonial era, when ships were propelled by wind, the ideal sailor was agile, 
quick to obey, willing to endure danger and discomfort, and experienced in the ways of the 
sea. Few qualified for service, so any able-bodied man who came close to fulfilling this 
ideal was welcome in the Navy. Race was secondary to manpower requirements. Although 
black Americans often received lower wages than their white counterparts, they 
nevertheless shared the same mess, hung their hammocks side-by-side, and worked 
alongside each other on board seagoing warships [Ref. 6]. 
Following the Civil War. white attitudes toward blacks changed in society and in 
the Navy. This shift in attitudes is captured by the following passage from Bernard C. 
Nalty's history of black Americans in the military, Strength/or the Fight (1986): 
... the relationship between conservative whites and the black populace now changed. 
Instead of treating the black as a ward, dependent upon their good will for protection 
against the white rabble. the conservatives allied themselves with a class they despised 
to disenfranchise all blacks (and the poorest of whites who might become their eco-
nomic and political allies), isolating the black race from the mainstream of political, 
cultural, and social life. A series of statutes, the so-called Jim Crow laws, enforced 
racial segregation, at first in the old Confederacy but later throughout the nation, 
thanks in part to a series of Supreme Coun decisions dealing with voting rights and 
public accommodations [Ref. 6:p. 61]. 
Racism had become so deeply ingrained in AmeriL:an life that whites would rarely 
work with blacks. Nor would whites bunk with and eat with blacks in the close confines of 
a warship. Over time, the status of blacks in the Navy came to reflect the diminished 
condition of their civilian brethren. 
2. The Steam Age 
The steam age ushered in a new fleet of ships that were larger and more numerous 
than their wooden predecessors. With these new ships came new manpower requirements. 
The Navy needed a new type of enlisted man, possessing skills and abilities very different 
from those demanded of wooden-ship sailors. The Navy preferred volunteers with an 
aptitude for operating machinery rather than the talents to work aloft in foul weather. 
Experience at sea was less important and gave way to comprehensive training at recruit 
depots and on ships. The Navy not only needed a different kind of volunteer. it needed more 
of these people than before. Whereas 130 men crewed Andrew Dona, the Navy's first 
warship, it took 827 to man Admiral Perry's flagship, Connecticut. The steam-age Navy 
came to depend upon young, white volunteers who possessed the aptitude to function on 
steam ships but whose attitudes reflected the Jim Crow legislation that was emerging 
throughout the country. The realities of re(.:ruiting persuaded naval leaders to turn their 
backs on the black sailor. Few, if any, were accepted; and those who were accepted were 
segregated from their white shipmates. Except for a few men in the engine rooms, most 
black sailOT~ were relegated to the messman rating [Ref. 6]. 
The demands of World War I did little to affect the racial composition of the 
Navy. Of 238,000 enlisted men on active duty in 1919 Gust prior to demobilization), only 
6,000 (less than 3 percent) were black. This compared with 5 percent in 1907. when 
Admiral Perry sailed around the world [Ref. 6]. 
Restrictions on the enlistment and assignment of blacks continued after the 
conclusion of World War I. By 1919, the Navy refused to accept any more black recruits. 
Those already in SClVice might reenlist, but many of the veterans who had become petty 
officers were attaining retirement age and leaving the service. As a result, by the end of 
1941, the Navy had just 29 blacks who were not part of the steward branch [Ref. 6]. 
Like the Army, the Navy entered World War II as a racially-segregated service. 
However, blacks and whites were kept separate in a different manner. The Army 
maintained units manned entirely by blacks (but commanded. by whites), They were housed 
and employed. in a fashion that would minimize their contact with white soldiers. By 
contrast, the Navy enforced segregation by occupation. Black sailors might serve with 
whites in a large ship, but with few exceptions, blacks prepared and served food or waited 
upon the ship's officers. Because all blacks performed essentially the same duties, they 
were easily segregated, They worked, ale, and slept apart from the restofthe crew [Ref. 6]. 
3. After World War II 
On July 26. 1948, just three months before the presidential election, President 
Harry S. Truman issued Executive Order 9981, which "declared to be the policy of the 
President that there shall be equality of treannent and opportunity for all persons in the 
anned services without regard to race, color, religion, or national origin." Additionally, 
promotions were to be based "solely on merit WId fitness. ,,2 The order also established the 
lNote that Executive Order 9981 did not specifically promi~ jntegration~ it promised "equality oflreatment 
and opportunity." Since the policy or the armed lOrces was "sepamte but equal" treatment oftlle races, the 
order was IbesubjeclofSOOleCOllb"Oversy and confusion [Ref.7J. 
President's Committee on Equality of Treatment and Opportunity, which was expected to 
work with the Secretary of Defense and the Service Secretaries in implementing the new 
policy [Ref. 71. 
Executive Order 9981 did not, however, result in the immediate desegregation or 
equal opportunity for blacks in the armed forces. None of the Services fully embraced the 
Executive Order until 1950, when events on the Korean peninsula forced a rapid build-up 
of all the Services. The Navy's expansion for the Korean War attracted more black recruits 
than could be fully absorbed by the steward branch, leading the service to broaden 
opportunities for training in other specialities. From 18,000 in 1948, the total number of 
blacks in the naval service dropped below 15,000 in 1950, and then expanded to 24,000 
once the War began. By 1956, three-founhs of the 37,000 blacks in the Navy were assigned 
to positions other than in the steward branch [Ref. 6}. 
In the 19605, the Navy continued to broaden opportunities for blacks, which 
subsequently benefited all minorities. However, prejudicial attitudes persisted, and a period 
of racial tension marked by episodes of violence followed. These incidents were a 
reflection of the social forces operating in the 1960s. It was the collision of the civil rights 
movement, the antiwar movement, the "War on Poverty," federal legislation to create a 
"balanced society," and the "channeling" policies of the Selective Service that aroused 
public awareness of equity issues in the military. Like their civilian counterparts, blacks in 
the Navy became more vocal and, in some cases, violent in their demands for equal 
opportunities and fair treatment [Ref. 7:p.37J. 
By 1970, Admiral Elmo Zumwalt was Chief of Naval Operations and blacks 
represented 5.5 percent of the Navy's enlisted force. This compared with about 11.6 
percent in the general population. Zumwalt attempted to encourage the recruitment of 
blacks by relaxing aptitude standards for enlistment. However, occupational assignment 
continued to be made primarily on the basis ofaptirude tests. Zumwalt's decision to lower 
standards to attract more black recruits proved somewhat self-defeating, because a majority 
of blacks could not score high enough on the aptitude tests to qualify for many of the more 
desirable ratings. Consequently, blacks continued to gravitate to the lower skill occupations 
[Ref. 61. 
In the early 1970s, American participation in Vietnam diminished and draft calls 
declined. The declining pool of draft-induced volunteers available to the Navy forced the 
Service to establish lower entry standards for aptitude and education. Many of the new 
recruits who entered because of the lower standards were black. But, as before, the new, 
lower-qualified sailors could not qualify for technical training and were relegated to the 
least desirable jobs in the Navy [Ref. 6]. 
By 1974, one year after the draft ended, the proportion of black enlisted men in 
the Navy had increased from 5.5 to 8.1 percent. In that year, blacks represented 11.7 percent 
of first-term volunteers in the Navy, marking the first time in history that the proportion of 
black recruits matched or exceeded the level of black representation in the general 
population [Ref. 8]. 
Despite the progress in overall force composition, inequities in promotions, 
occupational selection, and administration of justice persisted. In response, the Navy, for 
the first time, recognized the possibility that systemic institutional discrimination could 
exist in many personnel areas. Equal opportunity and affirmative action programs were 
inaugurated throughout the 1970s to address these problems. The effect was to focus 
attention annually on issues of equal opportunity. Sailors received racial awareness 
training, and conunanding officers were required to annually assess the equal opportunity 
climate in their commands. Commanders were required to identify deficiencies and 
establish actions to address these deficiencies. 
In sununary, the long history of blacks in the Navy is replete with personnel 
policies and practices that have been less than fair. For many years, segregation was carried 
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out in the Navy by policies that restricted access to occupations. Despite this tainted past, 
the plight of minorities in the Navy has significantly. albeit gradually, improved since 
World War ll. Manpower needs were often the imperus for the greatest improvements. 
TocIay, there are no policies that discriminate directly against minorities. Affirmative action 
and equal opportunity programs have been in place to monitor and eradicatediscrimination, 
both direct and indirect, for nearly two decades. Still the question remains: how effective 
have past policies been, and what new policies., if any, are needed? 
B. APTITUDE TESTING FOR SELECfION, CLASSIFICATION, AND 
ASSIGNMENT 
The accession process for new recruits includes three stages: 
• The first is selection in or out of the Service, depending on whether or not a person 
meets the minimum qualification standards. 
• The second is classificatWn, or the determination of an individual's qualifications for 
specific occupational specialties. 
• The third is assignment to training for a specific occupational speciality. 
Assignment to training for a specific occupational specialty is hased in part on 
qualification standards and on the needs of the Service. It is important to note that 
qualification standards for the Navy include more than just passing scores on the enlistment 
test; they also include educational, medical, physical, and moral standards. 
1. Evolution or the Selection Process 
The U.S. military has been a leader in the field of personnel testing and selection. 
The fundamental purpose for using selection criteria is to eliminate "bad risks" and those 
who cannot meet the "severe demands of war" as well as to select people who can be 
trained most effectively and efficiently [Ref. 9]. 
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The issue of military selection based on aptitude was first raised in World War I. 
The weapons used in this war were significantly more lethaJ and sophisticated than in 
previous conflicts. To ensure soldiers were equal to the task, military leaders sought a 
screening technique. The Army Alpha and Army Beta tests were subsequently developed 
to provide military conmanders an index of the learning of their men. Additionally, these 
tests were designed to give manpower and personnel planners an objective basis to make 
personnel assignments by separating slow and fast learners into different categories 
(Ref. 8:p. 22]. 
After World War I, the purpose of the military's screening process shifted from 
preparing men for war to limiting the number of potential pensioners. During the post-war 
period, the military was concerned that unfit men might enter the military and then later be 
discharged for an injury received supposedly while on active duty, thereby securing a 
pension through contrivance [Ref. 8:p. 20). 
During World War II, the Army replaced the Anny Alpha test with the Army 
General Classification Test (AGCf). The AGCf was used to determine general learning 
ability. It also separated soldiers into five grades (I-V). The test was standardized to ensure 
that scores were representative of the age, education, and geographic distributions in the 
civilian manpower pool. The rapid learners (those who scored above 130) were place in 
grade I, while the slower learners (those who scored below 69) were placed in grade V 
(Ref. 8:p. 22]. The military has always had members who range the entire spectrum of 
learning abilities. A 1%5 study by the Department of the Anny, Marginal Man and 
Military Sefllice, describes how the Army has utilized soldiers who have been classified as 
"marginal." The study points out that everyone is marginal, at least in some area, and that 
"marginality is a relative concept which can be meaningful only in a defined context." 
[Ref. 10] 
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After World War n. the Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force jointly 
developed a test to screen enlisted personnel. The Anned Forces Qualification Test 
(AFQT) was introduced in 1950; and, although it has been revised over time, the AFQT 
remains in use today. In the years following World War n, each service employed its own 
test to classify recruits for training in an occupation. In 1976. the Department of Defense 
(000) introduced the Anned Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASV AB) as a service-
wide instrument for selecting and classifying all military recruits [Ref. 11]. 
2. Norming and Scaling 
Before a military aptitude test is introduced. its scores are calibrated to an existing 
score scale that can be interpreted in terms of expected performance. Qualification 
standards require a score scale that indicates the level of expected perfonnance and does 
not change the meaning when new fonns of a test are introduced. The initial AFQT and 
Service classification batteries were calibrated to the distribution of the Anny General 
Classification Test and the Navy General Classification Test score of men who served 
during World War IT (a standard commonly referred to as the "44 metric"). As new fonns 
of the ASVAB were introduced. they too were calibrated to the World War II population 
so that the meaning of qualifying standards remained relatively constant [Ref. 11). 
3. The Infamous Misnorming Incident 
Three years after introduction of the new ASV AB in 1976. problems with the new 
exam developed. Allegations surfaced that the quality of new accessions was well below 
that of previous years. After intense investigation. the Department of Defense discovered 
errors in the method used to convert raw scores to percentile scores. In February 1980, the 
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower, Reserve Affairs, and Logistics informed 
Congress " ... that the Services might be enlisting a higher percentage of low scoring 
individuals than was previously thought to be the case." [Ref. 81 
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Although the misnorming problem with ASVAB Forms 5, 6, and 7 was corrected 
very quickly, with the introduction of ASVAB Forms 8, 9, and 10 in October 1980, 
tremendous damage had already been done. Hundreds of thousands of people qualified for 
enlistment and assignment to technically demanding occupational specialties who would 
not have qual ified if the scores had been accurately scaled [Ref. 8]. 
4. Classi fi cation and Assignment using ASVAB 
Various forms of the ASVA B have been developed since the original version was 
introduced as part of the Department of Defense High School Testing Program in 1968. 
Forms 5, 6, and 7 were the first versions to be used under the Joint-Service testing program 
that began in 1976. Fonns 5, 6, and 7 consisted of 12 subtests designed to examine a 
recruit's abilities in areas considered important to military jobs. In October 1980. DoD 
overhauled the ASVAB, replacing Fonns 5, 6, and 7 with Fonns 8, 9, and 10. The new 
versions consisted of only ten sublests. Some previous subtests were combined, new 
subtests were created, and some old subtests were eliminated. Subsequently, DoD has 
introduced new versions comprised of the same subtests: Forms I I, 12, and 13 in October 
1984: Fonn 14 in July 1984; Forms 15, 16, and 17 in January 1989; and Forms 18 and 19 
in July 1992 (Ref. II :p. 89-93]. 
Forms 8 through 19 test ski ll s in the following areas: Word Knowledge, 
Paragraph Comprehension, Arithmetic Reasoning, Numerical Operations, Coding Speed, 
General Science. Mathematics Knowledge, Mechanical Comprehension, Electronics 
Infonnation. and Auto/Shop Infonnation. The first four measure general trainability, and 
the second six measure more specialized knowledge considered relevant to technical 
vocations. Tables 2 and 3 list the ASVAB subtes\s with a brief description . the number of 
questions, and testing time in minutes for Fonns 5, 6, and 7, and Fonns 8 through 19, 
respectively. The subtests are combined in different combinations 10 form composites. 
TABLE 1. ASVAB SUBTESTS: DESCRIPTION, NUMBER OF QlIFSfIONS, AND TESTING 
TIME FOR FORMS 5 THROUGH 7 
Arithmetic Reasoning (AR) Word problems that emphasize reasoning 20 20 
rather than mathematical knowledge. 
Altention to De1ail (AD) A speeded tesltoCQUOI the number of "C's" 30 
embeddedinsertesof"O's". 
Automotive Informmion (AI) Knowledge of aulomobiles. 20 10 
Electronics Information (EI) Knowledge of electricily. radio principles 30 15 
and electronics. 
General Information (01) Infonnation on Geography. sports. history. IS 
automobiles. 
GenernJScience(GS) Knowledge of physical. and biolOf!ical 20 10 
science.'l. 
Math Knowiedge(MK) Knowledge and skills in algebra, geometry. 20 20 
andfiactiOIlS. 
MechanicalCompn:hension(MC) Understanding oCmechanical principles. 20 15 
such as gears. pulleys. and hydraulics. 
Numerical Openuions (NO) A speeded test of the fourarithmelic SO 
operati.ons-addition,sUbtnlClion, 
mulliplication.division. 
Shop Information (51) Knowledge of shop practices and use of 20 
lools. 
SpacePen::eption(SP) Identifying athree-dirnensional figUl'e 20 12 
obtained from foiding a fiat pattem. 
Word Knowledge(WK) Understanding the meaning ofWOJds. 30 10 
Source: Departmenl of Defense, Test Manualfor Ihe Armed Services IVcalional Aptitude Ballery. 
July 1984. 
Each service applies minimum test standards referred to as "cut scores" to establish the 
minimum aptitude requirement for entry into the military and qualification for training in 
a specific occupation or rating. The choice of subtests used to create a composite is based 
on the ability of the subtests to predict perfonnance in training and later, performance in 
the occupation. A report by the Defense Manpower Commission in I fJ76 describes the 
principle applied to determining composites: 
Eligibility for assignment to jobs involving, for instance, mechanical work was deter~ 
mined by the score a person achieved on a test purportedly predictive of mechanical 
aptitude. Thus the qualification of individuals for assignment to all occupations in 
which mechanical work predominated was governed by the score attained on the 
" 
TABLE 3. ASVAB SUBTESTS: DESCRIPTION, NUMBEIl OF QUESTIONS, AND TESTING 
TIME FOR FORMS 8 THROUGH 19 
Arilhmetic Reasoning (AR) Word problems Ihat emphasize reasoning 30 36 
rather lhan mathemalical knowledge. 
Auto/Shop Infonnation (AS) Knowledge of automobiles, shoppraclices 25 
lIIIduseoftools. 
Coding Speed (CS) A speeded lest 10 maICh words and numbers. S4 
EJectronicsInfonnation(E1) Knowledge of eleclricily, radio principles 20 
lIIIdelectronics. 




Math Knowledge (MK) Knowledge IIIId skills in a1gebm. geomttry, 25 24 
and fractions. 
McchanicalComprehension(MC) Understandingofmecllanicalprinciples, 2S 19 
SIlchasgears,puI1eys.andhydrnulics. 
Numerical Operations (NO) A speeded test oflhefourarilhmelic 50 
operations-aidition, subtraction, 
multiplication, division. 
Paragraph Comprehension (PC) UnderslaOding Ihe meaning of paragraphs. 15 13 
Wool. Knowledge (WK) Understanding Ihe meaning of words. 35 II 
Verbal(VE) SummalionofPCandWK. nJa nJa 
Source; Depanmentof Defense, Test ManJlllljor the Anned Services Vocational Aptitude Batlery, 
July 1984. 
mechanical aptitude test. Similarly, other occupations characterized by another com-
mon and essential type of work such as clerical activities, were grouped together in 
occupational "clusters" corresponding to the common aptitude required. TIris practice 
continues today, although the various aptitude tests have been periodically refined over 
the years [Ref. 8:p. 69], [Ref. 12:p. C-3]. 
The AFQT is an ASV AB composite used by all Services for enlistment screening. 
The AFQT is used to predict an applicant's overall "trainabiIity." With Fonns 5, 6, and 7. 
the AFQT consisted of the Word Knowledge, Space Perception, and Arithmetic Reasoning 
subtests. With Forms 8 through 14, the AFQT consisted of Word Knowledge, Paragraph 
Comprehension, Arithmetic Reasoning, and one-half the value of Numerical Operations. 
[n January 1989, the AFQI' was revised so that it consisted of twice the combined value of 
Word Knowledge and Paragraph Comprehension, plus Arithmetic Rea.~oning and 
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Mathematics Knowledge. Tables 4, 5, and 6 show the ASV AB composites and their 
component subtests for Forms 5 through 7, Forms 8 through 13, and Forms 14 through 19, 
respectively [Ref. l1:p. 90]. 
TABLE 4. COMPOSITES AND COMPONENT SUBTESTS: ASVAB FORMS 5 THROUGH 7 
DeseriptioD Co .. posite Component Subtests 
Armed Forces Qualification Test 
Clerical 
AFQT WK + AR+ SP 
CLER WK + AD + NO 
EJectronics ELEC AR+MK+GS+EI 
GeneraJ.Technical GT WK+AR 
Mechanical MECH WK+MC+SI 
Source: Department of Defense, Armed Servicts VocatiollQl Aptitude Bat/ery (ASVAB) Test MalUllll. 
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TABLE 5. NAVY COMPOSITES AND COMPONENT SUBTESTS: ASVAB FORMS 8 THROUGH 
13 
Desc.:riptioD Composite 





Basic Eleclricity/Electronics BEJE 
Boiler Tech/EnginemanJMachinist Mate BT,lEN/MM 
Submarine SUB 
Machinery Repair MR 
HospitalmaJI Hl\.{ 
Communications Technician cr 














Source: Department of Defense, Armed Services Vocallonal Aplilude Sal/try (ASVAB) TeSI Manual. 
1984. 
SeeThb1e3forthefuUnameofeachsubtest. 
"VE is an abbreviation for Verbal composite and includes the Word Knowiedgearni Paragraph Com· 
prehensionsubtests. 
Every Service uses minimum AFQT scores in their enlistment standanls. None 
of the Services uses AFQT specifically for job assignment. Certain Navy ratings (e.g., 
Basic Seaman) have no specific aptitude composite reqWrement. 
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TABLE 6. NAVY COMPOSITES AND COMPONENT SUBTESTS: ASVAB FORMS 14 
THROUGH 17 
Description 

























Source: Milton H. Maier, Defense Manpower DaIa Center Technical Report 93-007. 
See Table 3 for the fuU name of each subtest. 
·VE is an abbreviation for Verbal composite and includes the Wool Knowledge and Pamsraph Com-
prehensionsubtesls. 
The Department of Defense and Congress require that the AFQT scores of new 
recruits be reported in percentiles, grouped according to traditional AFQT categories. 
Percentile scores reflect a person's "trainability" relative to that of the general youth 
population. A pen:entile score of 50 is the mean score for the general youth population. A 
percentile score of 70 indicates a standing at or above 70 percent of all persons in the 
norming population. Those who score in category V (a percentile score of 9 or below) are 
considered "well below average" in trainability and are legally barred from military 
service. Traditional AFQT categories, percentile scores, and levels of train ability are listed 
in Table 7 [Ref. 8:p. 73]. 
The Services may increase their minimum AFQT standards to reduce the eligible 
pool of recruilS and concentrate recruiting efforts on persons with higher test scores. For 
example, during a good recruiting year, the Services may find that the pool of applicanlS in 
the above-average range is large enough so that standards can be tightened for persons 
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TABLE 7. ARMED FORCES QUALIFICATION TEST (AFQT) CATEGORIES BY 
CORRESPONDING PERCENTILE SCORES AND LEVEL OF "TRAINABILITY" 
AFQT AFQT Le~el of 




IOa 5Q.64 Averase 
IIIb 31-49 Average 
IV 10-30 Below average 
1-9 Wellbelowa~e 
Source: DepartmentofDefell5e, Defense Manpower Qualify: Volume I (WashillglOll DC: Office of 
the AssisllUlt Secretary of Defense fOt" Manpower, Installations, and Logistic~, May 1985). 
scoring at lower levels. perhaps restricting admission to high school graduates who score 
in the "average" and above levels. 
As previously noted, each Service uses its own composites for assigning 
personnel to occupational training. The Services also choose the minimum acceptable score 
that will allow a person to qualify for training in a particular occupation. Previous studies 
have noted that there are differences between the scores of minorities and others on the 
ASVAB [Ref. 13]. These differences have raised questions about the fairness of the test 
and, more generally. about fundamental disparities in the abilities of particular minority 
groups. Are blacks, for example, inherently less qualified than whites for technical 
occupations; is the ASV AS somehow biased; or, is there some other explanation or 
combination of reasons to account for the test score differences? 
C. TEST FAIRNESS FOR MINORmES 
The fairness oftests for minorities is a great concern of the Services. Beginning during 
the Viemam era and continuing with the A VF, the Services became more sensitive to the 
impact of testing on all individuals, noting especially the impact on members of racial! 
ethnic subgroups and women. The concern remains that personnel decisions in terms of 
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both selection and classification may not be fair for all groups. A number of studies have 
examined race~related differences that occur in aptitude testing. Some of these efforts have 
specifically addressed the fairness of the military's enlistment test. This section reviews 
some of these studies and examines what those differences are. 
One of the most comprehensive studies to examine the correlation between individual 
differences and ASV AB scores is Demographic Influences on ASV AB Test Perfonnance 
(1984) by Darrell Bock and Elsie Moore. This 1984 study reports the results of the 1980 
"Profile of American Youth" in which the ASVAB was administered to a representative 
sample of 12,000 young people between the ages of 15 and 23. The Profile study was 
undertaken in part to establish new national nanos for the ASV AB. The study by Bock and 
Moore found that average test scores for blacks are almost always lower than those for 
whites and Hispanics, and in some cases by as much as 100 scale points. Bock and Moore 
found evidence of a small group of blacks, amounting to perhaps to percent of the black 
population, whose scores are comparable to those of whites. They concluded that these 
blacks were participating more fully in the majority culture as represented in the content of 
the vocational test [Ref. 13]. 
In a highly detailed and thoroughly researched book on the subject of bias in 
standardized testing, Arthur R. Jensen's Bias in Mental Testing (1980) examines 
psychometric methods for detecting bias and for applying standardized tests fairly in 
education, personnel management, and other areas. Jenson, a controversial figure in the 
field of testing, concluded that the most widely used standardized tests are not biased 
against any of the native-born English speaking minority groups for whom sufficient data 
exist Jensen further concluded: ''The observed mean differences in test scores between 
various groups are generally not an artifact of the tests themselves, but are attributable to 
factors that are causally independent of the tests." [Ref. 14]. 
As previously mentioned. racial/ethnic minorities. as a group. score lower than whites 
on aptitude tests in both civilian and military testing programs. Consequently, this means 
lower qualification rates for these minority groups. As such, aptitude tests continue to 
receive great scrutiny with respect to their fairness as predictors of performance in training 
and on the job. 
Beginning in the 1970s. the Services started to evaluate the predictive validity of the 
ASVAB for blacks. A consistent finding is that the mean score for blacks is about one 
standard deviation below that of whites. This fact by itself shows an adverse impact on, but 
not necessarily a bias against, blacks. Test fairness is usually evaluated on the basis of how 
accurately it predicts the perfonnance of minorities as compared to that of whites. In a 
Department of Defense repon entitled Sensitivity and Fairness of the Armed Services 
Vocational Aptitude Banery (ASV AB) Technical Composites (1992), fmdings suggest that 
the ASVAB is equally accurate in predicting training grades for raciaVethnic minorities. If 
discrepancies existed, it was because the tests tended to predict higher than the actual 
performance of minorities [Ref. 15]. 
Figure I provides a graphical indication of the differences in qualification rates for 
black men and for the entire population of new male accessions during fiscal 1994. Each 
circle represents a rating with an ASV AB qualification requirement. Qualification rates for 
the overall population are located on the diagonal line. Only selected ratings are identified 
by name. Figure 1 demonstrates that black men qualify at lower rates for all ratings that 
have ASVAB quaJification requirements when compared with the entire Navy male 
enlisted population. 
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FIGURE 1. A-sdlOllI Qualificatioo Rates for Nelt' Accession in the NaVJ'. Fiscal 1994 
..... 
o .... KI. "'1ItJ.CM.oo.SW.UT 
o ~r.:::AM~~r 
''''_ofAII_QoooItfoII 
Source: Derived from daIa provided by the Center for Naval Analyses. 
Only selected ratings are labeled. 
D. AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 
1. Federal Affirmative Action 
The nation experienced a resurgence in consciousness concerning inequality of 
minorities in the United States in the 1960s. The term "institutional racism" or 
"institutional discrimination" was first popularized in the literature in 1967 (Ref. 16]. 
Activists and social scientists adjusted their focus from personal forms of discrimination to 
institutional forms, particularly those in the work place. Many came to believe that passive 
non-discrimination would not adequately address institutional forms of discrimination. The 
federal government required government contractors to take positive steps to ensure that 
minorities were employed and treated without regard to race, creed, color, religion, or 
national origin. Executive Order 10925 of 1961 directed positive measures for the 
elimination of any discrimination, direct or indirect, in the federal government [Ref. 17}. 
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibited discrimination in programs receiving federal 
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assistance and established the Equal Employment Opportunity Conurussion. By 1972, 
Executive Order 11246 required affmnative action programs of government agencies 
including the armed forces and all federal contractors. 
For 000 activities, heads of organizations are responsible for equal opportunity 
in their respective jurisdictions. 000 requires the Armed Services to formulate, maintain, 
and carry out affmnarive action plans that establish quantifiable good faith goals, 
timetables, and accountability in personnel management [Ref. 18]. 
2. Navy Affirmative Action Plan 
a. Description 
Prior to 1971, the Navy had no service-wide program specifically designed to 
address racial discrimination. In response to the 000 requirement. the Navy began its fIfst 
efforts at increasing racial awareness in January 1972 with Navy-wide race relations 
training. By 1978, the Navy had instituted the Navy Affirmative Action Plan (NAAP), a 
comprehensive equal opportunity program still in effect today. The NAAP identifies 
specific categories in which the Navy will take positive, affirmative steps to achieve a 
demographically-balanced composition of personnel, ensuring fair treatment and freedom 
from discrimination. Accessions, assignments, promotions, and utilization of skills 
(occupational placement) are among the categories monitored. 
The NAAP is intended to be a continuing program of goals and actions with 
realistic milestones. Goals are reassessed on an annual basis, and milestones arerevised and 
updated by comparing statistical trends within each of the identified categories [Ref. 21. 
Many of the Navy's own studies provide evidence of a skewed distribution of 
minorities along the spectrum of occupational specialties [Ref. 5]. When compared with 
their overall percentages in the Navy. minorities tend to be underrepresented in the more 
technical ratings. This finding, in and of itself, would not necessarily justify an affirmative 
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action. The Navy's definition of affirmative action is ··the taking of positive steps to correct 
or eliminate present or future institutional discrimination that decreases equal opportunity 
due to race, color. national origin, religion, or gender, and all traces of past discriminatory 
policies or practices." [Ref. 2] To merit consideration for affirmative action, the unequal 
occupational distribution of minorities must be shown to be the result of institutional bias. 
As previously discussed, the history of the Navy is replete with personnel 
policies and practices that have discriminated against racial/ethnic minorities particularly 
blacks. It is open 10 debate whether rermlants of these policics and practices still exist. 
Nevertheless. by identifying occupational placement fo r minorities as one of the twelve 
major points in NAAP, the t\avy has ensured that this issue will receive continual focus. 
b. Program Application 
The l ob-Oriented Basic Ski lls (JOBS) program represents a potentially 
powerful tool of the Navy to combat disproportionate minority representation. JOBS is an 
intensive course of basic and remedial instruction. [t is provided to a select group of new 
recruits (of all races) who show promise bUllack the formal education to score high enough 
on the ASVAB 10 qualify for the more technical training programs. The effectiveness of 
JOBS as a key element in an ethnic/occupationa l balancing strategy arises from 
acknowledgment that minorities constitute a significant number of the population unable 
10 qualify for technical programs. 
Figure 2 shows the percentage of new recruits, both black and non-black. who 
score above and below the 50th percentile on the AFQT. Although the AFQT is not used 
directly for job assignment, it is an indicator of overall "trainability." As seen in Figure 2, 
there has been some improvement in the proportion of non-blacks scoring above the 50lh 
percentile between 1982 and 1985. During that same period, the proportion of blacks 
scoring above the 50th percentile actually declined. 
"GURE 2, Distribution of AF'QT Stores Above and Below Cbe SO Percentile lOr Black and Noo. 
BJaek Male New Recruits in FYlm, FYl!l81, FYl!l8S, and FYl!l88 
Source: Derived from data provided by Ihe Defen:se Manpower Data Center, 
FY79 Test Rellults are ''reIlormed'' to the 1944 metric, 
If the minority aptitude deficiencies depicted above could be overcome in 
sufficient numbers through the JOBS program, then proportional attendance at the A-
schools (the Navy's occupational training schools) might eventually be achieved and 
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occupational specialties would eventually become racially balanced. However, JOBS is an 
expensive program in tenus of both dollars and manpower. It is also dependent upon 
volunteers who perceive benefit from spending an additional period of time undergoing 
classroom training. It is unlikely that this program by itself could ever grow to the size that 
would be needed to achieve racially balanced occupational specialties. 
Through early 1978, Commander, Navy Recruiting Command (CNRC) 
managed assignment to A-schools with an archaic system of card files called "RACS." 
Increasing demands to meet monthly accession goals while paying closer attention to 
minority recruiting and placement soon rendered the manual methods ineffective. The 
answer was a computer program designed by Dr. Len Kroeker of the Navy Personnel 
Research and Development Center (NPRDC), implemented by the Navy in 1981 under a 
system named Personalized Recruiting for hmnediate and Delayed Entry (PRIDE). It 
provides the Navy with an orderly and efficient mechanism for the management and control 
of the recruiting process by perfonning several crucial recruiting functions. PRIDE 
automates the process of matching an applicant's personal preference and qualifICations. 
Access to PRIDE is available to all of the Navy's recruiters and classifiers via personal 
computer and modem. CLASP (Classification and Assignment within Pride) is the 
software model or algorithm that matches available training programs with applicant 
information and generates a list of programs that the applicant is offered. It takes various 
inputs such as ASVAB scores, physical qualifications, fill rates for given A-schools, 
historical attrition factors, Navy needs, and individual preferences and computes an 
"optimality index." The index is rank-ordered on the basis of the value of"optimalities" for 
each applicant, for each month. The list is automatically edited with respect to ratings for 
which the applicant is not qualified on the basis of physical standards or ASVAB score. A 
final edit removes all ratings for which there is no school quota or for which the applicant 
does not meet the "minimum optimality requirements." [Ref. 19:p. 1-30] 
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It is important to note that, regardless of how qualified an applicant might be, 
CLASP will automatically generate only A-school quotas that are available during a three-
month window. A-school quotas are determined by start dates, seat loading, and projected 
manpower requirements for a particular rating. If the applicant desires an A-school without 
a current quota, then the Navy classITter must manually query the program to determine 
when in the future a desired quota will become available. The obvious requirement to "sell" 
current A-school quotas usually means that approval from a higher authority is required to 
assign an applicant to a future quota. The PRIDE/CLASP classification and assignment 
process represents another powerful weapon to combat disproportionate minority 
representation because it offers an automated method to ensure Service goals are directly 
conveyed to the classifier. 
ASVAB scores are far and away the most important determinant in the A-
school assignment process. Poor performance on the ASVAB prevents many minorities 
from attending the most desirable A-schools. This circumstance no doubt accounts for a 
portion of the disparity in racial or ethnic representation with Navy occupations. Bxactly 
how much of the disparity can be attributed to "lack of skills" is not known. 
E. PREVIOUS RESEARCH ON THE OCCUPATIONAL PLACEMENT OF 
MINORITIES IN THE MILITARY 
Relatively little research has addressed occupational placement of various racial/ 
ethnic minorities in the military. Studies in this area are those done by Butler (1976), 
Nordlie et aI. (1975), Zucca (1984), Eitelberg (1988), and Barnhill (1991). 
In a 1 fJ76 study of trends in correlations between race and rank in the military from 
1962 to 1973, John Sibley Butler found negative correlation between the percentage of 
blacks and enlisted rank. Specifically, the higher the rank, the lower the percentage of 
blacks in the rank. Butler also found that, in the Army, blacks were overrepresented in non-
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technical occupations. and he found that there was no change in the trend of this distribution 
between 1966 and 1972. When the effects of mental ability (as measured by the AFQT) 
were controlled. the inequities in rank and occupational specialty distributions remained. 
as did the trend of representation between 1966 and 1973 [Ref. 20:p. 558-556J. 
In a second study, Butler (1976) examined black and white promotion in Anny 
technical and non-technical occupational specialities. When he controlled for aptitude. as 
measured by AFQT, he discovered that blacks in both categories were promoted more 
slowly than were whites and that whites attained a given rank faster than blacks. When the 
variable of education was controlled. Butler found that, with few exceptions. whites were 
promoted faster than blacks. Butler also controlled for type of occupational specialty and 
found. as one might expect. that both blacks and whites in technical occupations were 
promoted faster than blacks and whites in non-technical occupations [Ref. 21:p. 807-818], 
In a 1975 study of Anny occupational placement and promotion from 1962 to 1973. 
Nordlie et al. found that blacks were progressively underrepresented in higher enlisted 
ranks, particularly E8 and E9. The authors also found that blacks were overrepresented in 
infantry. gun crews. supply, service, administrative, and medical specialities and 
underrepresented in electronics, craftsman, communication, intelligence, and other 
technical specialties (Ref. 22]. Nordlie and his coauthors lacked data to control for 
qualifications required for various occupational specialties. As a result, they were unable 
to determine to what extent the racial differences found in occupational placement were due 
to the inability of blacks to qualify for high-skill occupations and to what extent the 
differences were due to racial discrimination. 
In 1986, Gary 1. Zucca, a former Naval Officer, examined the effectiveness of the 
Navy's Affirmative Action Plan with respect to occupational placement and advancement 
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of blacks and Hispanics. A significant portion of his work was dedicated to an assessment 
of minority representation in occupational specialties [Ref. 23]. 
Zucca hypothesized that complex organizations tend to protect their "core technology" 
from change. As applied to the Navy, core technology specialties include those involving 
the operation of weapons and propulsion systems aboard ships and aircraft. Peripheral 
specialties are those involved with support and administration. If such a phenomenon were 
occurring with regard to minority inclusion in the Navy, then all other factors being equal, 
minority representation should be greater in occupational specialties that represent 
peripheral technology rather than in those representing core technology. Alternatively, if 
all other factors were equal, the distribution of minorities among core and peripheral 
occupational specialties should move toward equality [Ref. 23]. 
Zucca discovered that, after attempting to control for aptitude, blacks and Hispanics 
were overrepresented in less-technical ratings and underrepresented in more technical ones. 
Less expected was Zucca's conclusion that black and Hispanic overrepresentation actually 
increased in non-technical ratings in direct relation to the degree of qualification required 
for entrance into those ratings. This contradicts the notion that disproportionate minority 
representation can be attributed solely to lower aptitude levels. He contends that many 
highly qualified minorities are being directed by the Navy into support, rather than 
technical ratings. Zucca asserts that racial inequalities in representation with regard to 
occupational placement are not explainable by the differences in the human capital (formal 
education, training, experience) of Navy recruits [Ref. 23]. In Chapter m, I will examine 
and assess the validity of Zucca's methodology in controlling for aptitude and evaluating 
the Navy's occupational placement process [Ref. 23]. 
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In 1991, Jon T. Barnhill, a student at Naval Postgraduate School in MonteIey, 
California. replicated Zucca' s methodology using 1982. 1986, and 1990 data. He obtained 
results that reinforced those of Zucca [Ref. 24]. 
Chapter ill of this thesis reviews the methodology used in, and the results of, the 
earlier studies. The chapter also discusses weaknesses of the earlier studies and presents a 
new approach that attempts to overcome those weaknesses. 
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TIl. CO:'olTROLLING FOR TilE INFLUENCE OF APTITUDE: 
METHODOLOGIES AND RESt:LTS 
1l11', ~hJPler i, di\'llkd into three ,cd1on\ St"1I1on A bcpn,> wnh an eX.lmIlldtl0n 01 
£u~<:,j 119/l..j.l and B.lInhill (1 LJY I) to (ontrol fOI the inilucnce\ of aptitude. Sr, non tl 
lIllruduce, the ··A'~It!nmcnt Mt,de1," a nc\\ melhodology to c,,!ltTol fOT the inHucll<.c of 
apmude. '\u!->,edlo!l, pw\'ide a full dc\u1ption of the "A.",ignment MOlkl," inllmhng the 
ddtd ~()Uf<.e<; u.,ed, the popul,uJOn to Whl<:h the model is appJted. the cumputatlOn ur the 
model. l)('LujlJ.tlOnal group ddJIlltJOn" and ,\ dlscu"JOn of "dd'fercnce JI1dJCalUl~ , SeLllon 
A. THE CORE TECHl\'OLOGY MODEL 
ZUCLJ. (1<))\-1-) actudlly propO'l'd thrc'c mudd~ to Jnalyze the ICple,entatlOn uj 
mine'ntle, in '\avy Occu]latwnai ,peClal!le~ The) were the COhOlt MudeL the :->elf-Intere\t 
ModeL and [he ('Ole Technology Mudel. He hoped hh model, would expLlln the 
0c<:upatJOn,d di'lTlhutioll ur ethnic grllllj)<; 1n a <:ornple'\ urgalllzdtion (in thi~ ",be, the 
'\.1\'1') after the impiellJentdllon 1)1' ,In afflTTlIOltJVe action pollv)' Of the three. Zu.xa \ermed 
mo<;t 'iltl~fied with the re'ult.~ of the Core '1 echnulugy Model 1111\ mudel eXamllle\ an 
or~J.ni'Jticlil in telm~ oj Its "core" Jnd "pellpheIJlte(hnolt'gic\." A-; apphed t() lhe '.lvy, 
(0re to'tl1no]o1'y \peliaiL1e<; IIKlude th()-;e 1nvol\ing the f'peratlon of wedron~ dnd 
~Upp{)ft and adllUIlJ~nJtJOn. Examples ot pefJpheldi .,pecial!le~ Il1clude Yeoman, Me\\ 
Lnderthe as\umption th,lt orgamzatiolh de'me to protect thecorctelhnol0t'yfrolll 
oUhide mJ1\lellle lRd. 2-1-j, /un:<t .ngulO\ th,1I on:upanonJl .'pet ialltle., that reple~cnt the 
pll~ition~ ...... ithin tlw organinlion, who art:' also primarily ...... hilt:' and mak, tend to mamtain 
them a~ ~uch. Hence, Z\lc..:a'~ "Core Technolog) Hypolhe~ls" states th<Il, <Ill filClor~ bemg 
equal, lTllnonty group~ will be O\eITepre~ented in paipheraJ ol:l:upational .,penaltle~ and, 
com·ervdy, underrepre5ented!1l core t('chnology 'pe..:ialtie~ [Ref 2~, 2..:J-:p. 201 
1. Zucca's Data Sources 
DJ[>I for ZlIl:CJ'S ~tudy were oblairwd primanly from the \:a\)-wkle 
Demographic: Data Ba\e. His data identity the 0Cl:UpatlOnal ~pt:'nalty, rank, M:'\. and t"thnic 
Identity of the cntirt:' Kti\t:' dut) enllsted populdtlon tor the year~ I G7(),l 'J7'J. and I GX2 He 
~ekcted the,e pamcular year~ for th(' following rt·.l~ons: (l) they c:ont.lilled data on 
Hi\panic~, (2) Lhey ()ff\'f~d th(' most r('l:ent data J\.liIJble: and 131 I '-J79 pro"ided a lIlldpoinl 
rekrnlCe for the other two year"~ 111., d<Ila weft" <Iggrt'gale{l a, of tht:' end of the f!SLal year 
(September3()th} [Ref 2J.p.J-1-]. 
Hl\ second <;OU[ce of datil was the Na1'\' Enli([(!d ('areer Guide !()8(}-19I)J. Thl~ 
pubhc:atlOn provide\ lobde~cnptlon., for eat'h of the Na\ If Oll:llpatlOnal ~pel:ialtles >Inc! \\><I'i 
u~e-d to deternlll1<:: ""hdher an ou;upatlOn repr<::~t'ntt'd core or peripheral technolugit', 
[Ret. 2.':p. 34]. 
Hi~ third ~uurce of data wa'i tht" Navy RecrulIl'/"'s Manllal 
(CO\:fNAVCRLITCOM. 1'-J7'-J) The d.lta from the m<IrlUal pIIJVi(kd aptitude 1c'~t 
compo.\J\e\and cOITe~ponding"cut ,cores" JeljUired for .lCceptance into (he A-,chool, for 
each ol:CUpatlOn that reljuires A-sl:hool trallung [Ref 23:p.35J 
2. identification of the Population 
ZUC:C.l'~ ddta repre~ented the total male cnlIsted populalJOn 01 the Na~y for the 
year~ 1'171',. I '-J7LJ. and I'1X2. from thi, poplll<ItlOrl, on I) whIte, blal:k and Ili,pani~ t'thml' 
f'!OuP~ ""ere seleeled for 'ludy. ZUC:C.l vU!1~ldered tht:' rreatll1f'n\ ot \,omen heyond the ,..:ope 
of hi~ ~tud). AddJtlonall), ~even c:on<.uuniun uccup,llional "pt'cialllt:'s (Se-a nt't:'~! <Ind three 
Petty Officer occupational specialties were deleted from the population. Zucca deleted the 
Sea Bees because they were considered organizationally autonomous and, therefore, did 
not represent traditional Navy occupations. Zucca deleted the Petty Officer occupational 
specialties of Legalman, Master-at-Anns, and Navy Counselor because they are not open 
to incoming recruits, but rather obtain personnel via transfer from other occupations. 
3. Controlling For Aptitude 
To determine the degree to which aptitude influences the occupational 
distribution, Zucca (1984) attempted to isolate aptitude from other possible factors. To 
accomplish this, he needed a variable or proxy for aptitude that possessed the proper 
attributes. The variable had to be common to all members in the data set, it had to be easily 
quantifiable, and it had to be readily accessible. ASVAB scores fit all three criteria 
[Ref. 23]. 
Zucca (l984) realized the need to find a common basis by which to compare the 
many diverse occupations of the Navy. He believed no direct method existed to judge the 
differences in aptitude levels required for each of the Navy's ratings. The aptitude 
composites used to screen recruits for each rating are generally unique and contain no 
subtest common to all composites. The author auempted to standardize each composite 
score using the following methodology [Ref. 23]. 
To control for the aptitude variable (ASVAB scores), Zucca (1984) first ranked 
each rating in descending order hy the minimum score required for entmnce into that 
rating's A-schooL He then grouped individual ratings in the order of their ranking. Because 
each subtest making up a composite is standardized to SO, average standardized scores for 
each rating were computed by dividing the composite minimum score by the number of 
subtests forming the composite. Based on this average score, Zucca ranked all occupational 
specialties into one of three "aptitude" categories (Low, Medium, or High), with roughly 
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one-third of en1isted petty officers falling into each category. Table 8 provides the range of 
computed average standardized scores and their breakdown into aptitude groups (Ref. 23]. 
TABLE 8. APTITUDE GROUPS (BY SCORE RANGE) AS DEFINED IN THE "CORE 
TECHNOLOGY" MODEL" 




45.0 - 49.0 
49.1 - 51.6 
51.7 - 55.0 
t Scores werecalculaled by dividing lliecomposile minimwn score foreach rating's A·scllool by Ibe 
number of SUbleSlS forming Ihe composite. 
Looking at the Medium aptitude group in Table 8, the scores making up this 
category fall into a relatively narrow range on either side of the mean (50). Zucca indicated 
that the small variance associated with this "bunching" effect precipitated rather 
inconsistent and confusing results. Consequently, Barnhill (1991) discounted findings 
emanating from the Medium aptitude group. Both Zucca and Barnhill felt the occupational 
ratings falling on the extremes of the aptitude spectrum-the High and Low aptitude 
groups-offered the greatest potential for overrepresentation or underrepresentation of 
minorities [Ref. 24]. 
4. Difference Indicators 
Zucca (l984) used difference indicators to summarize and describe the 
occupational distribution of minorities [Ref. 23:p. 40]. Difference indicators were first 
introduced for military use by Nordlie et al. (1975). This method for summarizing 
differences in racial/ethnic composition assumes that all ethnic groups are randomly 
distributed throughout the population. For instance, if blacks constituted 18 percent of the 
Navy's population, under this assumption, one would also expect blacks to account for 18 
percent of each occupational speciality. Any difference between the actual minority 
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composition of the particular rating and the expected composition based on the population 
as a whole is reflected in the difference indicator. The fonnula for calculating the difference 
indicator is displayed in equation (1). 
Wllere: 
DJ =:; [( Actual )x 100j-IOO 
Expected 
Dl DifferenceIndicator 
Aclual 1beactual number of members of a particularrncial/elhnic group i in the calegory 
ofinlerestj 
Expected The number of members of the racial/ethnic group of interest one would expect 10 
find if members of that group were randomly distributed througllout the 
population. 
(1) 
The expected number is derived by multiplying the percent of the minority group 
in the aptitude group by the total population in that category. For example, suppose that 
within the highest aptitude group 18 percent are black. It follows that the expected number 
(of blacks) of any subset of that group would be the total number of members of that group 
times (.18). 
The expected number is divided into the actual number to fonn a ratio. This ratio 
is multiplied by 100 so it can be expressed as a percentage. Finally, 100 is subtracted from 
the result so that, when the actual and expected numbers are equal, the difference indicator 
equals zero. Thus, any overrepresentation of the minority group appears as a positive 
number, and any underrepresentation appears as a negative number. 
Continuing with the example, suppose the subset of interest forming the highest 
aptitude group contains 1,000 members and that 110 are black. The expected number (of 
blacks) would be 180 (from 1,000 x.IS). Equation (2) solves for the difference indicator 
(DI): 
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DI = 1 (~lX 100-: -100 ~ 180 _ 
DI = -38.9 (2) 
The negative sign denotes underrepresentalion. and the 38.9 indicates that, for this 
particular subset of ratings, at this particular aptitude level, blacks are 38.9 percent 
underrepresented. 
The selection of the expected population is crucial to the determination of the 
difference indicator. This is where Zucca's model deviates from Nordlie et al. (1975). 
Nordlie used the entire enlisted population of the Army as the basis for computing the 
expected percentage of each ethnic group. This, of course, assumes that minorities arc 
distributed evenly without regard to their individual qualifications. In Zucca's model, the 
expected percentage used as a base are those enlisted personnel with the level of 
qualification required for the particular set of specialties being evaluated (i.e .. those 
corresponding to High. Medium, or Low apti tude). In this way, Zucca attempted to control 
for aptitude 
The Navy Equal Opportunity Office, in its annual assessment of equal 
opportunity and affumative action programs, uses the same equation for calculating 
difference indicators as does Nordlie et al. (1975) and Zucca (1984). However, the Navy's 
version, called the Minority Representation Index (M RI). like Nordlie et al. (1975), 
incorporates the entire enlisted force as the base for relating expected percentages of 
minorities [Ref. 5J. 
5. Occupational Categories 
In his Core Technology Model, Zucca categorized occupations according to the 
job description of each occupational speCialty. Each Navy rating was aSSigned 10 either 
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"Core," "Core-Support," or "Support Technology" based on the following criteria 
[Ref. 22. 23 J: 
• Core Technology: Ratings involved in the operation of propulsion, detection, or weap-
ons systems aboard ships and aircmft. (Example: Sonar Technician, ST) 
• Core-Support Tecluwlogy: Ratings whose primary job fu nctions are to maintain and 
n:: pair eq uipment directly associated with the operation of ships and aircraft . (Exam-
ple: Aviation Sffil ctural Mechanic, AMS) 
• Support Technology: Ralings that provide logistic , medical, and administrative support 
to the operating forces. (Example: Disbursing Clerk, DK) 
6. Results from the Core Technology Model 
Figures 3 and 4 present the results from the application of Zucca's Core 
Technology Model. Zucca fo und that blac ks, with the exception of those in ranks E4-E6 in 
HGllRF. J , Results From tbe Core Tecllnology Model: Diffe rence Indicators ror Blacks, F.4-E6 
HigoApf,uoc Mod "umApti' ooo 
~ r---0 :979 a , C,I~ r--- In. 
II II n 
_"III II II I 
~: .~. I III III 1-IIIUIil 
Source: Gary J. Zucca. "Ellmic Di~trib utiun Amung u .s . Navy Occupalion Spcciallicsand Ranks: 
Orgalt i7.:,tj()nal ltll plication~ ." PII.D. Disscrtalion. UniversiIy of Florida. 19!\4 
the medium aptitude group, were underrepresented in core technology and core support 
technology occupations and overrepresented in support technology occupations in all 
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FIGURE 4. Results From the Con Technology Model: Difference Indicators for Black.~, E7-E9 
High AplituOC MoiliumAptitoo. Low Aptitud< 
Kh , 01979 
111 912 11 11 .nl 
II I IIII :a III lUI I!! 
I II lUI -UII II .. H r----
Soorct:: Gary 1. Zucca, "EThnic Distribution Among U.S. Navy OccupaTion SpeCialTieS and Ranks: 
Orgallil.alional Implications.~ Ph.D. Dissertluion, University of Florida, 191:\4. 
categories of aptitude. He (;onciuded that many highly qualified minorities were being 
directed by the Navy into support. rather than techni(;al ratings. Because the greatest over 
representation of bla(;ks o(;curred in "High aptitude" ratings rather than the "Medium 
aptitude" or "Low aptitude" ratings, the author asserted that racial inequalities in 
representation with regard to occupational placement are not explainable by the differences 
in the human capital (formal education. trJ.ining. experience) of Navy recruits alone 
[Ref. 231. 
7. Cohort Effect 
Studies. such as those by Zucca (1984) and Barnhill (199 1). that analyze cross-
sections of the entire enlisted force to evaluate personnel policies over time will inevitably 
suffer from a cohort. effect. Specifically, if there were a disproportionate representation of 
a particular minority among a given eohon of qualified entrants into a certain occupational 
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specialty in the past, this same disproportion will likely remain with the cohort as it 
progresses through the years of service and the paygrade structure. Since the Navy accepts 
virtually all of its recruits at the entry level, it would take a considerable period of time after 
the implementation of an affirmative action plan for the results to be seen. Consequently, 
there is a considerable delay (perhaps as great as twenty years) between conception, 
implementation. and accomplishment of specified affirmative action and equal opportunity 
goals throughout the entire paygrade structure. Thus, with studies, such as those by Zucca 
(1984) and Barnhill (1991), that analyze changes in occupational distributions using cross-
sectional data over periods of only six to eight years, it is entirely possible for the results of 
significant policy changes to appear imperceptiblY small or to be masked altogether by the 
residual influence of prior policies or exogenous elements. 
8. An Assessment of Zucca's Methodology for Controlling for the InOuence of 
Aptitude 
The procedure employed by Zucca (1984) to control for the influence of aptitude 
cannot be mathematically verified or even assigned a statistical degree of significance. Any 
assessment of Zucca's model must therefore be made on the basis of its theoretical 
assumptions. The following are some of the weaknesses in Zucca's approach: 
The author assumes that because all ASVAB subtests are standardized to a mean 
of 50, it is possible to make direct comparisons of various subtest averages. This may not 
be accurate. If two particular composites to be compared had several subtests common to 
both, a certain amount of validity could be assigned to this procedure. However, comparing 
two composites with no subtest in common is a somewhat dubious procedure. 
The author categorizes aptitude groups based on a single score range. However, 
composite score minimums or "cut scores" are flexible over time. They are often raised or 
lowered based on changes in manpower requirements or space availability in the training 
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pipeline. Funher, with the introduction of new ASV AD forms over time, composites that 
determine qualification for some ratings have changed By establishing aptitude group 
criteria for the entire cross-section, Zucca assumes that qualification standards in 1959, for 
example, are equivalent to those in 1982. This, of course, is not the case. 
The most serious misspecification arises from the method Zucca uses to 
determine aptitude distributions. By categorizing aptitude groups on the basis of the 
number of personnel in a given rating, Zucca assumes that the selection, classification and 
assignment process places individuals in occupations strictly on the basis of aptitude. As 
we know from the description of this process in Olapter II, several other factors also 
detennine placement These include education; personal preferences; physical, medical 
and moral qualifications; timing; and the needs of the Navy. Any methodology that 
determines aptitude distributions on the basis of where personnel are actually assigned will 
also capture the influences of these other factors. 
The work done by Zucca 10 analyze ethnic distributions among Navy 
occupational specialties is the most comprehensive to date. Although there are several 
weaknesses in his methodology, his efforts to control for aptitude, without the benefit of 
individual ASV AB subtest data. are nonetheless commendable. 
B. THE ASSIGNMENT MODEL 
This section describes an approach for evaluating occupational placement using an 
alternative methOdology to control for the influence of aptitude. 1bis section discusses data 
sources, the population of interest. and the details of this alternative approach. 
1. Data Sources 
The primary data for this study were provided by the Defense Manpower Data 
Center (DMDC) in Monterey, California. The data consist of four distinct cohort files 
created from the Navy enlisted Active-duty Master and Loss Edit File merged with selected 
data from the MEPCOM (Military Examination Processing Command) Edit file. The four 
cohorts represent persons who entered Naval Service in fiscal years 1979, 1982, 1985, and 
198B, respectively. The file includes the demographic variables for: sex, race, age. and 
education, among others. The cohort data fIles also include status of prior service, raw and 
standardized ASV AB subtest scores,3 ASV AB test form, and ASVAB test version.4 The 
occupational specialty (rating) and paygrade (as of the end of each fiscal year) are provided 
in annual increments for each record through the end of fiscal 1992. This study focuses on 
the occupational distribution in the fifth year of service for each cohort 
The data represent the entire male enlisted Navy population in a particular cohort 
in a given year of service and therefore require no statistical procedtue involving the 
estimation of population parameters, Thus, whatever differences are found between blacks 
and non-blacks will be significant because they are based on the popUlation, 
A second source of data is the Navy Recruiters' Manual 
(COMNAVCRUITCOMINST 1130 series) for fiscal years 1979, 1982, 1985, and 1988, 
respectively. This manual provides infonnation regarding the qualifications required for 
entrance into the various Navy enlistment programs, The data from the Navy Recruiters' 
Manual used for this study are the ASVAB subtest combinations (composites) and their 
minimum respective "cut scores" required for entrance into the A-school for each 
occupational specialty. Although subtest combinations are relatively stable throughout a 
recruiting year, "cut scores" are often raised or lowered based on manpower requirements 
or space availability in the training pipeline. This study uses the "cut scores" in effect at the 
end of the fiscal year of accession. 
'Subtest from ASVAB Forms 5. 6, and 1 have been "renormed~ to the 1944 melric. 
~ASVAB raw scores were convened to ASVAB slandardized scores by Mr. Robert HamillOJ\ of the Defense 
Manpower Data Center, Monterey, CaliflllTlia This author is indebled to Mr. Hamilton for his assistance 00 
this project. 
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2. Identification of the Population 
As stated previously, this study focuses on the male enlisted population in the 
regular Navy during the fifth year of service for each of four cohorts. Cohort data were 
chosen because each cohort offers for analysis a relatively homogeneous group of 
personnel whose occupational placement and career opportunities have been guided by 
essentially the same personnel policies. Additionally, by focusing on individual cohorts. we 
are able to more easily discern the impact of affirmative action and equal opportunity 
programs as they evolve over the period of analysis-in this case, from 1979 through 1993 
(the fifth year of service for the 1988 cohort). The use of cohort data eliminates one of the 
major weaknesses (the cohort effect) present in the Zucca study. 
The fifth year of service was chosen because this approximates the beginning of 
the "career force." By the fifth year, most of the remaining members ofa cohort will have 
"found their calling" and will be assigned to their career rating. Although the racial/ethnic 
distributions among occupations will shift somewhat as a particular cohort works its way 
toward retirement. these shifts are less the result of the occupational placement process. and 
are more related to advancement policies. 
This study is limited to male active-duty enlistees in the regular Navy. An 
examination of the treatment of women, although an important and relevant topic, requires 
a different theoretical approach and is beyond the scope of this study. Accordingly, women 
are deleted from the study population. 
Prior service personnel are not included because many of the policies affecting 
their occupational placement differ from those affecting other members of a cohort. 
Additionally, the inclusion of prior service personnel would introduce inconsistencies in 
paygrade analysis because prior service personnel often enter at a higher paygrade than a 
normal non-prior service accession. 
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After deleting women and men with prior service, and accounting for the normal 
attrition associated with five years of service, the remaining populations in each cohan are 
provided in Table 9. A total of 109 different occupational ratings were represented in the 
data. 
TABLE 9. SUMMARY OF DATA SET POPULATIONS FOR SELECTED COHORTS IN THE 
FIFI'H YEAR OF SERVICE 
Non.blacks Blacks Mining Mlulna Total 
Accession Intbe5th In the 5th Data Data In the 5th 
Year Year of Service Year of Service Blacks Year of Service 
FYI979 20,998 4.654 31 25,802 
FY1982 22.620 3,781 97 2S 26,523 
FY1985 22.524 3,948 153 
" 
26,659 
FY1988 22,551 5,541 28,218 
Source: Derived from dataprovided by the Defense Manpower DalB.Center. 
Missing Data are the result ofincomplete ASVAB or wing infonnatioo in an individual record. 
3. A~gnment Model 
The pUIpOse of the Assignment Model is to determine racial distributions across 
ratings after controlling for the influence of aptitude, Like the Core Technology Model 
specified by Zucca (984), the Assignment Model uses ASV AB scores as the proxy for 
aptitude, As previously discussed in Chapter II, ASVAB scores are not the only factor that 
influence the selection, classification, and assignment process. While other factors (such as 
education, personal preferences, physical, medical and moral qualifications, timing, and the 
needs ofthe Navy) 
influence ultimate assignment, ASVAB scores are the only component representing 
aptitude. To effectively control for the influence of aptitude, it is crucial that the model 
capture only the effects of aptitude. The Assignment Model accomplishes this by 
determining racial distributions solely on the basis of ASV AB scores. The Assignment 
Model does not attempt to replicate the results of the actual selection, classification. and 
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assignment process because to do so would introduce the unwanted influences of numerous 
factors other than aptitude. 
The Assignment Model uses a five-step process to determine racial distributions 
by occupation after controlling for the influence of aptitude. 5 The [rrst step is to detennine 
the total actual number in each occupational specialty at the fifth year of service for a 
particular cohort. For example, from the data set, there were 460 Aviation Electrician's 
Mates (AEs) in the fifth year of service in the FY 1985 cohort (not including women or men 
with prior service). 
The second step is to evaluate each record in the data set on the basis of ASV AB 
qualification requirements for each of the 109 ratings to determine overall qualification 
rates. For example, in FY1985, to qualify for the AE rating it was necessary to score a 
minimum of 196 on the sum of the standardized subtest scores for Arithmetic Reasoning 
(AR), General Science (GS), and twice the score for Math Knowledge (MK).6 In 1985. 
75.77 percent of the entire population remaining after five years of service qualified for the 
AErating.7 
The third step rank-orders each rating on qualification "selectivity." Once 
qualification rates for the entire 109 ratings are determined, then the 109 ratings are rank-
ordered on the "selectivity" of qualification. For the FY1985 cohort, the Journalist (10) 
rating was the most "selective" for which to qualify (only 51.74 percent of the total 
population qualified for JO). Conversely, each rating without a specific ASVAB 
requirement was the "easiest" with 100 percent of the cohort qualifying. 
5 Although this five-srep process could be completed m~ually, it is recommended that it be accomplished 
using the capabilities of acomputer. This swdy employed the SAS@statisticalprogramonanAmdahl® 
5995 mainframe computer 10 complete the five-step process, 
6Because a service member may have taken any number of different ASVAB Thst Forms,eacb record must 
be screened for test form and the appropriate combination of subtests and "cut scores~ applied, 
7Excluding all women and men with prior service, 
The fourth step is to randomly sort each record in the data file, While thi~ can be 
'Ko:.:umpli~hed in a number of different ways, for this study it was accumpli~hed by ~orting 
on the last four digits of the social security number, whio:.:h was provided by OMOC 
The fifth and final step employs an assignment algorithm that assigns each 
individual reo:.:ord to the most "~elective" rating for whiL:h an individual is qualililXl, This 
process is o:.:ontinued until the total number of individuals assigned to each rating is equal 
to the actual population of the rating, as based on the actual distribution (detennined in step 
one), Once a rating i~ filled, the algorithm ceases to assign individuals to that particular 
rating and considers only the unfilled ratings. This process is continued until every 
individual is assigned a rating. Once every individual is assigned a rating, then the new 
di,lribution of blacks and non-blacks within each rating repre~ents the original distrihution 
after controlling for the influence of aptitude, Cnlike Zucca's (1984) approach. High, 
Medium, and Low aptitude categories are not required became representation within each 
rating ref1ects a new distribution after controlling for aptitude. 
4. Occupational Groups 
Table 10 def'ines 14 broad Navy occupational groups. First uscd hy Shiells and 
:\-kMahon (1 (93) to examine the patterns of retention, advancement, and ~ea/shore ratios 
across rating~, these rating group, categorize rating~ by functional groups [Ref. 26:p. 191. 
Each of the 109 Navy ratings is assigned to one of the 14 categories. Occupational groups 
serve two purposes. hrst, they aggregate ratings intIJ a smaller number of categories (with 
larger population,) thLJS smoothing the misleading effects arising from a small numher of 
personnel in any single rating. For example, in the fifth year of service, the fY1985 cohort 
had a total of only eight Opticalman (OM). Given this small total number of penonnel, it 
would be possible for the FY198"i cohort to have perfectly proponlonal representation 
(based entirely on random assignment) and still have no black O.vls. Second, categorizing 
TABLE 10. OCCUPATIONAL GROUP DEFINmONS 
Occupational 
Group Name Abbreviation 
Surfaceenginecring Surfeng 





Aviation supply Avsupply 
Adminisoative Admill 
D«' 
""" Supply Supply 
Medical 
"'" 
10 Cryptology Cryp< 
Surface operations Surfo[)S-':s 
(combat systems) 
12 SurfaceoperatiOIlS Surfops 
13 Submarine S,b 
14 0<1", ""~ 
Ratings 
BT, EN, GSE, GSE, GSM, MM 
DC, EM, Hr, IC, 1M, MI., MR, 
OM.PI,PM 
AD. AE, AF, AM, AME, AMH, 
AMS, AQ, AS, ASE, ASH, 
ASM, AT, AV. AX, TD 
AB, ABE, ABF, ABH, AC, AG, 
AO,AW,PH 
AK. AZ. PR 
DM, DP, JO, Ll, LN, MA, NC, 
PC, PN, RP, YN 
BM.QM,SM 
DK, MS. SH, SK 
DA. DN, DR. DT, HA, IDA, HN, 
HR 
CTA, CTl, CTM, CTO, CTR, 
err, IS 
DS, EW, FC, FfM, GM GMG, 
GMM, GMT, OT, OTA. OTM, 
OTM, ST, STG, WT, 
ET, ETN, EJR, OS, RM 
FT, FTB, FTG, MN, MT, 51'S. 
TM 
allolherratings 
Source: Shiells, Marlha E, anti Joyce S. McMahon, Effecls olSea Duty and Advancemenl on FirSI-
Term Relenlion., Center for Naval Analyses, 1993. p.19. 
ratings into occupational groups allows representation data to be analyzed for functional 
groups and for enlisted communities, 
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S. Difference Indicators 
Like Nordlie et aI. (1975) and Zucca (1984), this study uses difference indicators 
to summarize and describe the distribution of blacks across occupational categories. 






Of = [( Actual )XlOO]-IOO 
Expected' 
DifferenceIndica1Dl" 
The actllal number of blacks in a rating group i 
Thc number of blacks one would expect lO.li.nd in a rating group iasdetennined 
by IheAssignment MadeJ's percentage multiplied times the IotaI aC/JUlI number in 
lheratinggroupi. 
6. Assessing Annual Overall Trends in Black Representation Using the Annual 
Representation Index (ARI) 
The Annual Representation Index (ARl) provides a comprehensive annual 
measure of representation of a particular group (in this case, blacks) for all occupational 
groups. When ARIs are compared over time, they provide an indication of the effectiveness 
of policies and programs intended to improve representation. ARb are obtained from the 
summation of the absolute value of difference indicators in a particular year. The greater 
the ARI, the more disproportionate is the representation. An ARJ of zero would indicate no 
disproportionate representation. The Annual Representation Index (ARl) is defined by 
equation (4) below. 
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J 
ARI = L 01,1 
j = l 
ARI Annual Represeotation Inde~ 
j = I, 2, .. ,J 
Dlj ihedifferenceindicmorforoccupationalgroupl. 
C. RESULTS 
I. Cohort Demographics 
I" 
Figure 5 charts the pattern of change in each cohon from the end of the first year 
through the end of fisca l 1992. The vertical axis denotes the number of personnel and the 
horizontal axis denotes fiscal year, Dashed lines chart the number of non-blacks and solid 
lines chart the number of blacks over time. From Figure 5, the reader can sec the rapid 
attrition of each cohon over the first four years of service followed by a dramatic "leveling" 
by the end of the fifth year of service. By the end of the fifth year of service, the population 
in each cohort represents the "career forces." From Figure 5, the reader can also see the 
significantly higher rates of alttition as depicted by the slope of each line for non-blacks as 
compared to the line for blacks panicularly during the first four years of service. 
Table I I shows the number of black and non-black . non-prior service (NPS) 
enlisted men in selected cohorts for each year from accession through fiscal 1992. Table 12 
summarizes the total number of NPS men at selected years of service. From Table II, we 
can see steady growth in accessions with each succeeding cohort except the FY 1982 cohort 
which declined slightly. Remarkably, by the fifth, eighth, and eleventh year of service. the 
difference in the size of each cohort was relatively small. suggesting that for these 
particular cohorts. the growth in accessions from fiscal 1979 though fiscal 1988 did not 
translate into a significantly larger "career force:·8 
FIGURE S. The Distriblltion of'Male Nonoprior Service (NPS) Blacks and Non-Blacks fO!' Selec:ted 
Cohorts From Accession YearThr01llh 1m 
~ )0.000 
;'15.000 
Solllt:e: Derived from daIa provided by the Defense Manpower Data Center. 
In£onmuion as o£tbeendoflherespeclive fiscal year. 
Table 13 shows the percentage of black and non-black NPS men in selected 
enlisted cohorts for each year from the end of the accession year through fiscal 1992.9 
Interestingly, the percentage of blacks (as measured at the end of the accession year) grew 
steadily (from 13.5 percent to 19.2 percent) between the FY1982 and FY1988 cohorts. 
However, the percentage of blacks (as measured at the end of the accession year) declined 
(from 16.0 percent to 13.5 percent) between the FYI979 and the FY1982 cohorts. The 
decline in blacks (as measured at the end of the accession year) between the FY1979 cohort 
and the FY1982 cohort can largely be attributed to the introduction of ASVAB Form 8 in 
October 1980 which corrected the misnorming problem that had plagued earlier ASV AB 
8·'Queerforce" is defined bereas persomel remaining aI Ihe end of the cohort's fifth year. 
9NOIe that the number at the end of accession year is not the same as the total number ofaccessions in a par-
ticular year. The fonnerwill always be largerthan the latter because of amition Ihroughout tile cohan's fiIst 
"". 
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TABLE lL THE DISTRIBUTION OF BLACK AND NON_BLACK NPS MALES FOR SELECTED 
COHORTS FROM TIlE END OFTIlEACCESSION YEAR THROUGH 1992 
Fiscal Un!2 Coba!;1 ~ £1:128.5 I::ltblu:l ~ 
Year Non-Black Black Non-Black Black Non-Black Black Non_Black Black 
1919 49.679 9.485 
1980 45.434 8.821 
1981 41.314 8.016 
1982 33.822 6.670 49.983 7.793 
1983 21.117 4.685 48.872 7,718 
1984 11,316 4,014 44,048 6,941 
1985 13.934 3~96 35.584 5,567 54,331 9,347 
1986 12,823 3.24' 22,121 3,800 49,206 8.540 
1987 11,135 2,824 18,653 3,,7 44,904 7.818 
1988 9.971 2.S2S 14.184 2.833 36,390 6,192 
1989 9.192 2~96 13,584 2,584 22,(m 3982 
1990 8.676 2.164 12,094 2,318 18,552 3,503 
1991 8,302 2,08' 10,992 2.123 14.551 3,176 
1992 1,613 1,931 9,516 1,860 13,256 2906 







TABLE ll. THE TOTAL NUMBEROFNPS MALES FOR EACH COHORT AT THE END OF 
SELECTED YEARS OF SERVICE 
End of End of End of End of 
Coborl tsl Year 5tb Year 81h Year lUb Year 
FYI919 59.164 25,802 16,068 11.488 
FY1982 51,776 26,521 16,168 11.316 
FYl985 63,618 26,659 16.162 
FY1988 67,930 2.8,218 
Sourt:e: Derived from daIa provided by the Defense Manpower DataCenter. 
Infonnadon as of the end of the respective fiscal. year. 
forms. By correcting the misnorming problem, the Services reestablished intended aptitude 
screening standards, thereby excluding the population with aptitudes corresponding to 
AFQT Category V (on a properly nonned test).l0 Figure 2 suggests that a disproportionate 
number in this population are black. 
10 AFQT Ca!egories were defined above in 1hble 7. 
so 
rABlE 13. THE I'FRCE1WA(;E mSTRIFIUTION OF BLACK ,\~n :"oJO:-.i·BLACK N!'S l\f.\LES 
FOR SELECn-:H COHORT FROM AC'LESSIO~ YEAR nlROUGH 1992 
Fisl'al EY.l.212.....£. ~~~ 




191<2 83.5 16.5 8(J.5 Ll.5 
19K; 81.8 18.2 86.-1 13.6 
8!.2 18.8 86A 13.6 
1985 79.' 20.S n.' 8~.3 14.7 
7':!.~ 2n.2 85.7 14.~ HS.2 14.S 
1987 79.~ 2(1.2 H'i.l 14.'} 14.8 
I,});" 79.~ 20 . .2 16.1 
19WI ~().{l 85.1 
FNIl 83.') R4.1 
19'1] 1(i.2 ~2.1 17.9 
1'192 7':J,~ 16A H2.0 18.0 
SOllie\:: Denv"ct Irom rL'l.L1 proviu<XJlJy the Dctcns~ Manpower DJ.la ernler 





'fClble L'1 al~o depil:t'i the steady incrC'lIse 1Il the pc-rcc-Iltage of blacks wlthin c-al'h 
cohon over time. Thi~ incrc-l1se reflects the well-knowll fact that black~ are more likely to 
r~~nlisl than non-blacks and an~ Je~~ likely to kaye the :\avy through Jttririon thJll nOIl-
blacks 
2. Differences In Average Pa)'grade between Blacks and Non-Blacks 
Figure 6 graphically ckpicb the diffeT~n(;e over time in Jvera!'e pay grade between 
bJack and non-black ~'PS men for sdeCleri cohorl~. The vertical axis rlen()te~ paygrarl~ and 
the horjnmtal :lxis rlenotcs fiscal yeJI. Da~heri lines ciUlll the :lverage paygrar:k for enhSh;':d 
nun-black :\PS men. Solid line~ (;hart th~ average paygrade for enlisted bhH:k :\PS men 
The vertical dlfrerelKe in da~hed Clnd ~()lid line~ fepresent, the difference in average 
pay!'rade between non-hL.tcks and hlacb. I-rol11 Figure (1, it i\ clear that for ~\'ery year of 
service, blacb hJve a lower Jverage paygrJde when (;omparcd with non-blacks 
FlGLRE 6. The Difference in AI'enlJ'e Paygr:ade Between Black and Non·Black NPS l\Iale.\ l<'or 
Selected Cohorts From Acce~!iion Year TbrnuJ'h 1992 
Kot um::\pel:tedly. in addition to the difference~ in average pan'rade between 
blacks and non-blacks, there are differences in average paygrade among blacks depending 
upon occupation. Less expecLed, ho\\ever, are the difference" in avemge paygrade among 
blacks depending on the pacentage of hlack repre<;entation in a particular occupmion 
Figure 7 presenLs the a ... erage pay grade of blacks based on the percentage of black 
representation within an occupaLion. The vertical a.xi~ denotes average paygrade and i~ 
displayed in tenths. The horizontal axis aggregates Navy ratings by their percentage at 
black representmion. For e,xample, the first column repre~ents blaeb whose ratmg 
composition is between zero and nim: percent black. The hl:ight of this column corresponds 
to the average paygracte of blacks within these ratings. The information in FigUJe 7 relate~ 
only 10 black NPS men from the FYl%2 c(lhon in their fifth year of ~ef\·ice. This 
difference in average paygrade is consist.:nt bet\\'eo:n cohorts and is relatively consistent 
.'2 
FH;L"RF. i. TIt~Ay~r:a!!e Paygr:ao;te b~ PeITenlag~ "fRI:u'k ~epresentati/ln /If Occupali<ll1-
FYI'IHl Cohort In FIfth Y~:lr IJfService 
over time. Thi~ ~ugg~sts that moving an average bla!,;k ~ailor from a rating in \>'hich blacks 
are heavily (nerrepresented (4lV'c-J()()'kj to a rating in which lrtey arc undefrepresented 
«(IWk·()99c) \>'ould Improve the ~ailllr'~ rank by almo~t OIle- half of a pay grade (E·3.7 to E· 
·-L\). Figure S dl~play~ sinlllar information for blacks from the FYI %2 cohort III their ninth 
ycar of seIvi!';c. Thc Implication from Figure., 7 and l\ i~ that occupation~ historicall) 
"ll[]derrepre~ented" by blacb may ofkr greater advancemcnt opportunity for black> when 
compared with occupatiom hi~toricaUy "overrepre~ented" by blach. TI1C data. however 
:lfe inconclusIve concerning the c,\Use and effect of this relationship. It is not clear how 
much of the improved advancement opportunity b attrihutable to the ratinll. how mllch is 
;ntributable to the great~r ability of the per~onncl in thosc IMings. OI how much is 
attribut:lble to unob~er,,-ed factor'i 
1'1(;I!RE 8. The AveragE' i'a~·!(rade by Pel"C~ntage ofLllm:k Repr~elltation uf()ccupation-
FYI~82 Cobort in ~in(b Year of Service 
3. Dirrerences In ASVAB Scores Between Hlack5. and Non-Blacks 
As mentioned in Chapter n, a significant portion of the a~signment process is 
ba~ect on ASVAB composite scores. Composiles are composed of two to six suhtests. 
f'igure 9 display~ the difference in the relative performance of blacks and non-blal:ks on 
ea.::h of tht:~c subtcsts for the FYl9ll2 cohort. Subtests arc arranged along the horizontal 
axis from the greatest difference to rhe leas! difference between racial group~. Auto/Shop 
lnfomution, Mechanical Comprehension and General Science are rhe three ~uble~ts for 
which tht: greatest disparity exists. Assuming that aptitude ha~ the strongest influence on 
occupational placement. one would expeclthat occupations whose enITy qualification~ are 
ha~ed on subtest~ with the greatest difference beNt:en hlack and non-black. groups would 
have the lowe~! hla.:k representation and. conversely, those witll the least difference would 
hu,;e the highest black reprcselltauon 
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FIGURE 9. J\.lean ASVAB Standardized Test Scores for lIIack and Non.Black NPS Males from the 
FY19112Cohort 
Source: Derived from data provided by the Defense Manpower Data Center. 
Comparisons reHect ASVAB forms 8. 9, and 10. 
4. Results Of The Assignment Model 
To compare actual representation with "expected' representation, the difference 
indicators (Dis) are graphed in Figure 10 which presents Dis for black enlisted NPS men 
in the fifth year of service from the FY1979 cohort. The horizontal axis denotes the 14 
occupational groups into which all Navy ratings have been aggregated (see Table 10). The 
venical axis shows the percent of overrepresentation (positive values) and 
underrepresentation (negative values) of blacks in each occupational group. The 01 in the 
frrst column are based on expected value~ that control for aptitude and are derive{! from the 
Assignment Model. The Dis in the second column are based on the overall percent of 
blacks in a selected Navy cohan, and offer a referem.:e point against which to compare the 
first DI. For example, black I\'P$ men constitute IH.2 percent of the FYl979 cohort 
population in the fifth year of service. Within the Hull, Mechanical, and Electrical (HME) 
occupational group, the expected black proportion is 7.5 percent when the influence of 
aptilUdc is controlled. Con~equent1y. all else bemg equal. blacks shoulrl theoretically 
CO\lSlltute 7.5 percent of th{' personnel in H~E. The d{'gree to which aClUal rercent..!ge~ (in 
lhi~ example. Il.lJ percellt) 10 each o!;cupatJOoal categof) diffe'r from the e,pecled 
percentage 1m this example. 7.5 percent) 15 indicated by the graph of the difference 
lndlCator~ in Figure ID.ll ContinUing With the example. blacks III H:\fE:lIe ~ho\"n to be 
5,'~.6 percent oveITepre~ented. Thi~ mean~ that blJck repre~entation III the rating~ making 
up the H11E occupational group i~ SHJJ percent greater than would be expected if 
occupational placement wcre made \tJlctl) on the ba\is of aptttude. If occupallonal 
placement werc made without regard to pos5ible influence\ (aptitude. personal preferclll.es: 
physical. medical and moral qualifications: timin!;!. the need~ of tht" ~avy. or any othcr 
factor other than mndom a~Slgnmenl). thcn HME would be underrcpre5emcd by 17.6 
percent (a~ indicated b) the ~econd column). 
It is apparent from FigUTe~ 10. II. 12, and 13 thai evcn when the influence of 
aptitudc is controlled, black~ are predominantly overrepre~ented 1Il f\drruni~tratlve and 
Supply occupational gruup~.12 Conver~cly. black\ are prC<.iominantly underrepre~ente'd in 
[he AViatIOn Maintenance. Surface Operations. ann the Other category 
~'r" {I r"i In 
LhenumhLrofhbcl'Lnralmg~ro"pl 
the tL'lal number III ral"'g grour 1 
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FIGURE ll. Black Representation: Difference Indicators ror 14 (keupational Cal\~gories rorthe 
FY19112Cohort 
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Table 10 defines occupalional "i\leg[)rie~ 
FlGURE 12. Black Representation: Difference Indicators ror 14 Occupational Categories for the 
fY1985 Cohort 
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Supply Cryp' Surfop<-'" Sunop. 
Source: Derived from daI.a provided by the Defense Manpower Data Center. 
Representation percentages are summarized by difference indicators (Dis). 





"Overall Percentage·' DIs reflect expecled percentages equal 10 the overall black NPS male represen-
tationin the fifth year of ServiCe for the selected collon. 
Table 10 defines occupational categories. 
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Snpply ClJ'P1 Surfop • .." Surfop' 
Soun:e: Derived from data provided by the Defense Manpower Data Center. 
Representation percelllages are summarized by difference indicators (DIs). 




"Overall Percentage" DIs reflect expecled percentages equal to Ihe overall black NPS male refll*l1' 
lationin the fifth year of service for the seJected cohon. 
Table 10 defines occupational categories. 
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The Administrative and Supply occupational categories in Figures 10, 11, 12, and 
13 illustrate the striking difference in representation when the influences of aptitude are 
controlled versus when they are not. If representation were evaluated strictly on the basis 
of the overall black percentage in the cohort (i.e., not controlled for aptitude), these two 
categories would appear to be dramatically increasing in overrepresentation when 
considering the results from the FYI985 and FY1988 cohorts. When the influences of 
aptitude are considered, these occupational categories are still overrepresented; however, 
tilis overrepresentation is dramatically decreasing over the same period of time. 
5. Trends In Representation 
Figure 14 charts the trend over time in difference indicators. Difference indicators 
from Figures la, 11, 12, and 13 are consolidated in Figure 14. An examination of the trend 
over time of DIs derived from tile Assignment Model (depicted in solid black) offers an 
indication of the effectiveness of personnel policies intended to address disparities in 
occupational placement. If the Equal OpportunitylNavy Affirmative Action programs 
inaugurated in the seventies and eighties have been effective, one would expect a trend in 
representation toward the baseline. If the Equal Opportunity!Navy Affirmative Action 
programs have not been effective, one would expect a trend in representation parallel to or 
away from the baseline. Difference indicators that reflect no control for aptitude are 
provided as a point of reference (depicted in gray). When examining the results from the 
four selected cohorts for the 14 occupational groups, by the FYl988 cohort, 11 of the 
occupational groups (Surface Engineering, HME, Aviation Operations, Aviation Supply, 
Administrative, Supply, Cryptology, Surface Operations-Combat Systems, Surlace 
Operations, Submarine and the Other category) are, in fact, converging on the zero 
baseline; two (Deck and Medical) have dramatically moved through the zero baseline; and 
one (Aviation Maintenance) is holding parallel with the zero baseline. 
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FIGURE 14, The Tread ill DifTereuce Iftdicators ill Occupational Categories ror Selected Cohorts 
• Tholnflu""ceofAptiwdeisConlroUed I 
II!I ThelnfluenceofAptiwdei,nOlConIroUed I 
II . I . hi ,I III. 
I -.,. . 0. • ••••• " . • 
79a~B58B 19n358 79 328.1 a~ 19a2~~ n 79328.1 88 7912 ~S 8 79328~88 791HSS i9S21HB 79a~!S8 
SlIrfeng Avops Avsupply 
FIGURE 14 is conunuedon the nexlpage. 
Another method of measuring the overall trend in representation over rime is to 
compare the Annual Representation Index (ARl) from the ftfth year of service for each 
coh.on.13 Table 16 provides ARIs for selected cohons. When the influence of aptitude is 
13EquaIion (4) above defines the Annual Representation Index (ARI). 
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FIGURE 14. (Continued) 




Source: Derived from data provided by me Defense Manpower Data Center. 
Representation percentages are summarized by difference indicators (DIs). 
DIs that rellect controUing for the intluence of aptitude use "expected values" derived from me 
Assignment Model. 
Dis that reflect no control for the influence of aptitude use "expected values" equal 10 the overall 
black NPS male representation in the fifth year of service for me selected cohort. 
Table 10 defines occupational categories. 
TABLE 14. ANNUAL REPRESENTATION INDEX (ARI) FOR BLACK NPS MEN IN THEFIFTII 
YEAR OF SERVICE OF SELECTED COHORTS 
Cobort After Controlling SOl Controlling 
,,, Aptilude for Aptilude 
FY1979 599.0 659.2 
FY1982 732.4 531.6 
FYl985 376.7 597.5 
FYl988 243.5 848.3 
Source: Derived from data provided by the Defense Manpower Data Center. 
controlled, and with the exception of the FYI<.l82 cohort, ARls dramatically decline over 
the period of analysis. This suggests that policies and programs introduced during this 
period to address minority representation are indeed working to decrease the 
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disproportionate representation of blacks. When the influence of aptitude is not controlled, 
the message is quite the opposite. 
6. Factors Influencing Difference Indicators Over Time 
As noted above, difference indicators that are adjusted for the influence of 
aptitude may "behave" differently over time when compared with difference indicators for 
the same rating group that are unadjusted for the influence of aptitude. For example, from 
Figure 14, looking at the Administrative rating group, FYl985 and FYl988 difference 
indicators adjusted for the influence of aptitude (black colullUls), are "moving" in an 
opposite direction from the difference indicators (from the same cohorts and rating group) 
that are unadjusted for the influence of aptitude (gray columns). What are the forces that 
may be causing these difference indicators to move in opposite directions? The section 
below provides some insight into possible cause. 14 
Equation (5) below defines an unadjusted difference indicator and is derived from 
equation (1). Equation (6) below defines a difference indicator which is adjusted for the 
influence of aptitude and is derived from equation (3). 
141 am grateful to Dr. Martha Shiells of the Center for Naval Analysis for assistance on this section. 
Define 
Difference Indicator unadjuSled for the influence of aptitude 
VI' Difference Indicaloradjusted for the influence ofaptirudc 
8, the actual number of b!acks in rating group i 
lhe percentage of blacks in all ratings 
lhelutaJ nurnber(black and non-black) in rating groupi. 
Then the unadjusted differem.:e indicator can be \-witten as lB, \ - x 100 T. 
DI = -'-'-j-lOO, 
and the adju~ted difference indicator can be written as 
DI' == I';, x 100 x 100J\ - 100 
-x 100 
\ Ti 




If we let 
And since 
DI = DI+ 100 
100 
DI' = DI' + 100 , 
100 
_ T. _ B. rxDIxT [11, x 100] _ DI= -'-,- ~rxDI:~xlOO~Bi = ~. 
_ B 
DI' =---'-B/ 




From equation (6) the reader can see that the adjusted difference indicator will decrease 
whenever: (a) the actual number of blacks in rating group i (Bi ) decreases; or (b) the number 
of blacks assigned by the Assignment Model to rating group i (BI ,) increases. 
Equation (7) above defines the relationship between the adjusted difference 
indicator and the unadjusted difference indicator. The adjusted difference indicator wilL 
decrease whenever: (a) the percentage of blacks in all ratings (r) decreases; (b) the 
unadjusted difference indicator decreases; (c) the total number in rating group i (T/) 
decreases; or (d) the number of blacks assigned to rating group i by the assignment model 
(B/') increases. With respect to (a), the data in Table 13 indicate that the percentage of 
blacks in all ratings (r) decreased only in the FY1982 cohort and thereafter the percentage 
of blacks increased in the FY1985 cohon and the FY 1988 cohort 15 
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Under what circumstances might the adjuSted diffen:nce indicator decrease and 
the unadjusted difference indicator increase (or remain unchanged) as in the case of the 
Administrative rating group previously discussed? This could occur whenever: (a) the 
ASVAB cut scores leading to A-school training for ratings within rating group i are 
lowered (or ASVAB cut scores leading to A-school training for ratings from other rating 
groups are increased), thereby pushing more blacks into rating group i; (b) the ASVAB 
component subtests which define aptitude qualification for A-school training for ratings 
within rating group i are redefined to include subtests for which the mean differential 
between blacks and non-blacks is greater (or the ASV AB component subtests which define 
aptitude qualification for A-school training for ratings from other rating groups are 
redefined to include subtests for which the mean differential between blacks and non-
blacks is smaller) thereby pushing more blacks into rating group i; or (c) the average 
differential in aptitude (as measured by the ASV AB) between blacks and non-blacks is 
different in selected cohorts. In the case of (c) above, if the particular rating group i was 
composed of ratings requiring predominantly lower skill. and the differential in aptitude 
between blacks and non-blacks was greater in a selected cohan when compared to previous 
cohorts, then the number of blacks assigned to rating group i (B/) would increase, thereby 
causing the adjusted difference indicator to decrease. Similarly, if the particular rating 
group i were composed of ratings requiring predominantly higher skill, and the differential 
in aptitude between blacks and non-blacks were smaller in a selected cohan when 
compared to previous cohorts, then the number of blacks assigned to rating group i (B j ') 
would increase also causing the adjusted difference indicator to decrease. Data from Figure 
2 suggest that the differential in aptitude between blacks and non-blacks has increased 
slightly over time. 
15The percenlllge of blacks refem:d to here is as of me end ofthe cohen's fifth year. 
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lbe relative difference in the movement over time between adjusted and 
unadjusted difference indicators does not appear to be explained by any single factor 
discussed above. Instead, such movement is the result of the combined influence of all 
these factors. 
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IV. A COMPARISON OF RACIALIETHNIC DISTRIBUTIONS IN NAVY 
RATINGS WITH RACIAL/ETHNIC DISTRmUTIONS IN CIVILIAN 
OCCUPATIONS: METHODOLOGIES AND RESULTS 
Until now, the focus of this study has been an examination of raciaUethnic 
occupational distributions in the Navy. Navy distributions from selected cohorts have been 
compared over time to assess the magnitude and persistence of disproportionate 
representation in various Navy occupational groups. As one attempl~ to assess the different 
occupational distributions in the Navy, several questions arise: (1) How do racial/ethnic 
distributions in Navy ratings compare with raciaUethnic distributions in the general 
population? (2) Given the significant differences in respective populations and 
occupational placement processes, are comparisons between Navy occupational 
distributions and civilian distributions possible? (3) And, if so, are comparisons between 
Navy occupational distributions and civilian distributions useful? This chapter addresses 
these questions. 
Chapter IV is divided into three sections. Section A discusses the relative differences 
between the occupational selection processes used by the Navy and those found in the 
civilian sector. Section B describes data sources, the civilian and Navy populations used for 
comparison, and the methods employed to enable comparison of civilian and Navy 
occupational distributions by race. Section C provides the results of that comparison. 
A. DISCUSSION 
The processes leading to occupational placement differ significantly between the 
Services and the dvilian population. As explained in Chapter 11, occupational placement in 
the Services is a multi-stage process requiring selection, classification, and assignment to 
training, and completion of training for the occupation. Research has shown that most 
military recruits make their occupational choice first on the basis of Service (i.e., Army, 
Navy, Air Force, or Marine Corps) and second, on the basis of occupational specialty [Ref. 
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8]. Armed with this knowledge, Navy recruiters normally "sell" the Navy ftrst then they 
negotiate A-school training (which normally determines occupational assignment). 
Recruits receive normal pay while attending school. 
Conversely, most job aspirants in the civilian sector must obtain their occupational 
training at their own expense and prior to securing a job. This alone may cause any group 
that has a lower economic status to be dissuaded from seeking training-intensive 
occupations. Most entry level workers in the civilian sector make occupational choices 
first, on the basis of occupational preferences and second on the basis of employer. 
Although federal law prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, color, national origin, 
creed, or religion, employers in the civilian sector rarely face the same level of scrutiny or 
pressure (both within and outside of the organization) to adhere to these laws as does the 
military. These obvious differences in the occupational placement process are likely to 
result in differences in raciaVethnic occupational distributions. The next section describes 
a methodology for comparing Navy raciaVethnic occupational distributions with civilian 
raciaVethnic occupational distributions. 
B. METHODOLOGY 
1. Data Sources 
This portion of the study relies on data from three sources: the 1992 Active-Duty 
Master ftle, the 1991 Current PopUlation Survey (CPS), and the Department of Defense 
Master Crosswalk file. Data on the 1992 enlisted Navy cross-section were extracted from 
the Active-Duty Enlisted Master file. These data were provided by DMDC and they 
include, among other demographic variables, Navy rating, sex, age, and raciaVethnic 
identity, Data on the 1991 civilian cross-section were extracted from the Current 
Population Survey. These data were provided by the National Bureau of Economic 
Research to Professor Stephen L. Mehay, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, 
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California. Annual data were obtained by consolidating data from four monthly surveys. 
Data from the monthly sUiI'ey were adjusted for seasonal activity and weighted for 
rotational schedule in accordance with procedures rccolllillendcd by the Bureau of Labor 
Stati~tks. These monthly ~urveys of the population are conducted through a scientifically 
selected sample designed to represent the civilian noninstitutional population. Re~pondents 
are interviewed to obtain information about the employment status of each memher of a 
household 16 years of age and over. The inquiry relates to activity of ~tatus during the 
calendar week. Sunday through Saturday, whkh im.:ludes the 12th day ofthe month. Actual 
field inten'iewing is conducted the following week. Inmates of institutions and persons 
under 16 years of age arc not covered in the regular monthly surveys. Each month. about 
60,000 occupied unit~ are eligible for interview. Ahom 2.600 of the~e homeholds are 
contacted, but are unavailable for interview. This results in a noninterview rate of between 
4 and 5 percent. In addition to the 60,000 occupied units, there are 11.500 sample units in 
an average month that are visited but are found to be vacant. Part of the sample is changed 
each month. The rotation plan provides for three-fourths of the sample to be common from 
one month to the next. and one half to be common with the same month a year earlier [Ref. 
27J 
The survey defines persons as employed if they are civilian and they (I) did any 
work at all as paid employees, in their own business. profes~ion, or on their own farm, or 
who worked 15 hours or more as unpaid worken in an enterprise operated by a member of 
the family; and (2) all those who were not working but who had jobs or businesse~ from 
which they were temporarily absent because of illness, bad weather, vacation, labor-
management disputes, or personal rea~on~, whether they were paid for the time off or were 
~eeking other johs. These CPS data include among other demographic variables, civilian 
occupation, sex, age, and racial/ethnic identity 
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The Depanment of Defense Master Crosswalk Data file provides a listing of 
military occupations and Census of Population codes that defme civilian occupations 
closely matched to the military occupations. The 000 Master Crosswalk file provides a 
link between the 1992 military cross-section and the 1991 civilian cross-section that allows 
comparison of occupational distributions. The 000 Master Crosswalk file was provided by 
DMDC. 
2. Identification of the Population 
Consistent with the other portions of this study. the 1992 Navy cross-section is 
limited to male active-duty enlistees in the regular Navy. To ensure a demographically 
comparable civilian population, the civilian cross-section is limited to males who are 
employed full time and are ages 18 to 38. The 000 Master Crosswalk data file matched 95 
Navy ratings with civilian rating equivalents. Table IS summarizes the black and non-black 
percentages in the two populations. Note the significant difference in the percentage of 
TABLE 15. SUMMARY OF BLACK AND NON·BLACK POPULATION P~RC~NTAG~S 
Population 
1992 Navy Cross-Section 







Source: Derived from data provided by the Defense Manpower Data Center and the U.S. Depanmem 
of Labor. Bureall of Labor Statistics. 
black men in the general population (fully employed in occupations closely matched to 
Navy ratings) as compared to those in the Navy (6.9 percent versus 18.0 percent). If data 
were available to screen the civilian population for educational, physical, medical and 
moral qualifications, the disparity in these percentages would be even greater. The fact that 
the percentage of black men fully employed in civilian occupations closely matched to 
Navy ratings is less than half the percentage of black men in the Navy attest~ to the greater 
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opportunities in these occupations available to qualified minorities in the Navy, when 
compared with the general population. 
3. Occupational Groups 
To facilitate an analysis of representation by functional groups, each of the 95 
ratings was assigned to one of 14 occupational groups defined in Table 10. Table 12 
summarizes the black and non-black percentages within each of the 14 rating categories. 
TABLE Hi. SUMMARY OF BLACK AND NON·BLACK PERCENTAGES BY OCCUPATIONAL 
Occupational l:Iau: 1!1:[!oI:DliI&l:~ Cil:i1iao 1!1:[!oI:DliI&l:~ 
Group Black Non-Black Black Non-Black 
Surfellg 14.0 86.0 7.3 92.7 
HME 14.4 85.6 8.3 91.7 
Avrnaint 12.0 88.0 5.9 94.1 
Avops 20.6 79.4 8.8 91.2 
Avsupply 20.7 79.3 5.9 94.1 
Admffi 25.9 74.1 6.7 93.3 
""" 
23.9 76.1 10.7 89.3 
Supply 31.2 68.8 7.1 92.9 
MOO 19.2 80.8 7.5 92.5 
Cryp. 14.7 85.3 5.9 94.1 
Surfops-cs 10.4 89.6 7.3 92.7 
Surfops 18.1 81.9 6.9 93.1 
S,b 11.4 88.6 8.8 91.2 
O<hcr 21.0 79.0 6.4 93.6 
Source: Derived from data provided by the Defense Manpower Data CCllIer and the U.S. DepamncllI 
of Laoor Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
4. Representation Comparisons Using Difference Indicators 
In the same manner first introdut:ed by Nordlie et al. (1975), differen(';e indicators 
are used to summarize and describe the distribution of blacks across occupational 
categories within the civilian and Navy populations. When difference indicators from the 
two populations are charted on the same graph, they provide a basis for comparing black 
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occupational representation, Difference indicators are based on equation (2) above, but 
with the changes identifled in equation (8), as shown below. 
Where: 
Ac/U.al 
DI '" [( Actual 1 x 1001-100 
Expectedt J 
DUferenceIndicawr 
The actual percentage of blacks in rating group i 
The percentage of blacks in the population. For the 1992 Navy cross-section, 
"expect.ed~ '" 18.0 percent. For the 1991 civilian cross-section. ·'expected'· = 6.9 
percent. 
5. Segregation Index 
(8) 
Assuming that "equitable representation" in occupations was defined strictly on 
the basis of the representative minority percentages in the population, and assuming it is 
the goal of the Navy to balance occupational representation on the basis of these 
percentages, then the segregation index provides a measure of the magnitude of movement 
required to equalize the distribution of two groups (in this case, blacks and non-blacks). 
The index is based on the absolute deviation in the percentage employed in each occupation 
and indicates the percentage of minority workers that would have to shift between jobs to 
equalize the occupational distributions of the two groups. The segregation index is defined 




F n) is the percentage of the non-black wort force in occupation j 
F bj is the percentage of the black work force in occupation j. 
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C. RESULTS 
1. Black Representation as Measured by Difference Indicators 
Figure 16 provides a comparison of difference indicators reflecting black 
representation in Navy ratings versus similar civilian occupations. Difference indicators are 
computed using equation (6). Figure Hi graphically demonstrates the dramatic differences 
between the Navy distribution and the civilian distribution. Of the 14 occupational 
categories. six (Aviation Maintenance, Aviation Operations. Deck, Supply. Medical. and 
Cryptology) have representation in the same direction. seven (Surface Engineering, HME, 
Aviation Supply, Administrative. Surface Operations-Combat Systems, and Submarine) 
have representation in the opposite direction, and one (Surface Operations) has actual 
representation equal to expected representation in both the Navy and civilian distributions 
Of interest, the persistent overrepresentation of blacks in the Navy Administrative and 
Supply categories is not duplicated in the civilian labor force. However. the 
underrepresentation of blacks in Navy Aviation Maintenance occupations is duplicated in 
the civilian labor force. One explanation relates to the type of training required to enter 
these respective occupations. The Aviation Maintenance occupations, in general, require 
very expensive, highly technical, extremely specialized training. The training and the job 
experience received by military personnel in this occupational category are quite often 
directly transferable to the civilian labor force, Civilian employers, no doubt, seek out these 
veterans for their military training and, more importantly, their valuable job experience. It 
is not surprising that many in the civilian Aviation Maintenance occupations received their 
inilial training in the Anned Forces. Thus, any disproportionate representation present in 
the military population would likely be transferred to the civilian popUlation. 
On the other hand, the Administrative and Supply occupations involve less expensive 
and less specialized training. The experience gained in these occupations is less 
FIGURE IS. A Comparison or Black Representation in Navy Ratings versus Similar Ch·jlian 
O<:cupations 
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Source: Derived from dala provided by the Defense Manpower Data Cemer and the V.S. Departm~nt 
ofL<tbor. Bureau ofL1borSlalistics. 
Representation percentages are summarized by difference indicators (Dis). 
transferable and therefore less valued by civilian employers. A smaller percentage of the 
civilian work force in these occupations received their initial training in the AImed Forces. 
Thus, civilian distributions in these occupations are less likely to be influenced by military 
distributions and are more likely to be the result of the dissimilar occupational placement 
processes. 
As noted above, the process leading to occupational placement differs significantly 
between the Services and the civilian population. And despite the rigorous approach 
employed here to match civilian occupations with Navy ratings, it is doubtful, given the 
unique characteristics of military service, that civilian occupations could ever be precisely 
matched with Navy ratings, Ultimately, these significant differences in respective 
occupational placement processes and populations indicate that comparisons of civilian 
occupational distributions with Navy distributions are of limited value. 
2, Segregation Index 
The segregation index is based on the absolute deviation in the percentage 
employed in each occupational distribution and indicates the percentage of minority 
workers that would have to shift between jobs to equalize the occupational distributions of 
the two groups. Equation (9) defines the segregation index. For the 1992 Navy cross-
section, the segregation index is 22.7 percent which means that 106,101 enlisted personnel 
would have to change occupations to achieve an equal distribution. 
77 
V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This chapter briefly sununarizes the study and presents the conclusions drawn from 
the results. It also offers some recommendations and suggests areas for further research. 
A. GENERAL 
A primary purpose of this study is to examine outcomes of the U.S. Navy's policies 
and programs to achieve equitable occupational placement of black men in the enlisted 
ranks. The long history of blacks in the Navy is replete with personnel policies and 
practices that have been less than fair. For many years, racial segregation was carried out 
in the Navy by policies that restricted access to occupations by blacks. Despite this tainted 
past, the opponunities for blacks in the Navy have significantly, albeit gradually, improved 
since World War II. Manpower needs were often the impetus for the greatest improvements 
[Ref. 6]. Today, there are no policies that discriminate directly against minorities. 
Afflrmative action and equal opponunity programs have been in place to monitor and 
eradicate discrimination, both direct and indirect. for nearly two decades. This study 
endeavors to determine how effective they have been by looking at the distribution of 
blacks in Navy occupations. 
It is well-documented that black men, on the basis of their overall percentage of the 
force, continue to be underrepresented in the Navy's more technical ratings and 
overrepresented in the less technical support and administrative ratings (Ref. 4], It is also 
well·documented, and proven by the data in this study, that black men have lower scores 
than non-black men, on average, on every subtest of the Armed Services Vocational 
Aptitude Battery (ASVAB}--a test designed to measure aptitude for occupational training 
assignment.~. The ASV AB has been shown to accurately predict performance in 
occupational training, and later, "on the job." [Ref. 15] Despite consistent differences in 
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ASVAB scores between blacks and non-blacks, studies have consistently found that the 
ASVAB i~ not biased against native-born English ~peaking minorities [Ref. 14]. 
Few studies, however, have documented how much of the disparity in black 
occupational representation can be attributed to ASVAB scores and how much is 
attributable to other factor~ acting upon the occupational placement process. Other 
important factors include: education; personal preferences; physical. medical and moral 
qualifications; timing; and the needs of the Navy. The possibility that personal and 
institutional bias may play ~ome role in the placement process cannot be discounted. 
Although the Navy devotes significant resources to ensure equal opportunity education and 
awareness of all Navy personnel, there are situations in which personal bias might affect 
the occupational distribution of minorities [Ref. 24:p. 641: 
• A weB-intentioned recruiter may unknowingly press personal stereotypes of minori-
ties and jobs onto an eager, yet ill-informed, recruit candidate. 
• Similarly. the "classifier." or career counselor at the Military Examination and Pro-
ce~sing Station (\1EPS). whose job it is to match recruit preferences and qualifications 
with available training openings. has a similar opponunity to interject personal bias. 
• During occupational training, instructon might grade minorities differently than non-
minorities or apply different standards to the two groups. 
• Once on the job. supervisors and managers evaluate an individual's performance. 
Their evaluations greatly influence the retention and advancement of all subordinates. 
Again. there exists the possibility that a supervisor could interject penonal bia~ into 
the evaluation process 
Clearly though. of all the factor~ that influence occupational placement. probably none 
have a greater influence than differences in aptitude as measured by the ASVAB. This 
study addresses how much of the disparity in black occupational representation can be 
attributed to ASVAB scores and how much is attributable to other factors acting upon the 
m;cupational placement process. ·Ibis is aC(;Qmplished with a new methodology that 
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enables an examination of black occupational distributions after controlling for the 
influence of aptiwde. Any disproportionate black representation that persists after 
controlling for the influence of aptiwde is likely the result of the other factors previously 
mentioned or some factor or factors presently unknown. 
B. CONCLUS10NS 
After controlling for the influence of aptirude, it was discovered that disproportionate 
black representation occurred in several occupational categories. Blacks are predominantly 
overrepresented in the Administrative and Supply categories. Conversely, blacks are 
predominantly underrepresented in the Aviation Maintenance, Swface Operations, and the 
Other categories: 16 
Detennination of disproportionate representation by itself does not provide an 
indication of the effectiveness of equal opportunity/affinnative action policies and 
programs. Rather, the existence of disproportionate representation tends to only validate 
the need for such programs. To measure the effectiveness or outcomes of these programs, 
it is necessary to evaluate the persistence of disproportionate representation over time. For 
example, if disproportionate representation were decreasing over time, then one could 
conclude that equal opponunity/affinnative action policies and programs were probably 
effective (in a comprehensive fashion) in addressing the issue of equitable representation 
in Navy occupations. Conversely, if disproportionate representation were increasing or 
remaining constant, one can conclude that equal opportunity!affinnative action policies and 
programs may be ineffective in addressing the issue of equitable representation in Navy 
occupations. After controlling for the influence of aptitude, and examining data over a nine-
year period, it was found that of the 14 occupational categories examined, 11 demonstrated 
a trend of decreasing disproportionate black representation (i.e., converging toward 
160ccupational categories are defined in Table 10. 
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balanced representation). Two categories had reversed their relative disproportionate 
representation: Deck from underrepresented to overrepresented and Medical from 
overrepresented to underrepresented. One category. Aviation Maintenance, was holding 
constant at a moderate level of underrepresentarion. These findings support the conclusion 
that, in general, the disproportionate representation of blacks in U.S. Navy ratings is 
decreasing. One cannot point to a specific relationship between these improvements in 
black representation and causal factors; but it is likely that the Navy's affIrmative action 
and equal opportunity policies have contributed 10 the change. 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS 
I. The Services sMuid establish representation goals and indi('ators based on 
distributions derived by a method that controls for the injlu£nce of aptitude. 
As equal opportunity and affirmative action programs evolve, it is important that 
occupational representation goals are attainable within the framework of legitimate 
standards. Any large organization such as the Navy, with a great diversity of jobs, must 
manage the complex task of providing a continuous supply of new personnel to fill job 
vacancies. Applicants have different characteristics and experiences that may qualify them 
for one type of occupation but not another. To maximize production and efficiency, the 
Navy must screen the applicant pool to determine each applicant's suitability for a 
particular occupation and to make an effective person-job match. This process is 
complicated by the fact that the available manpower pool is composed predominantly of 
young men and women who have limited job histories. Given the extraordinary expense of 
A-school training (particularly in the highly technical ratings), and the even greater 
potential expense, in tenns injury or death, of an over-matched sailor failing on the job, it 
is critically important that the Navy be able to effectively match applicants with jobs. 
Aptitude testing offers a systematic and cost effective method to assess an applicant's 
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potential for success in training and success on the job, Establishing minority occupational 
representation goals that have not considered the influence of aptitude is naive, because 
such goals may not be attainable given existing ASV AB standards, Lowering ASV AB 
standards for every occupation in which minorities are underrepresented would likely 
prove to be prohibitively expensive in human as well as training costs. Establishing 
separate ASV AB standards for minorities would violate the Civil Rights Act of 1991 which 
prohibits the establishment of separate employment standards on the basis of race, color, 
religion, or creed, 
In the past, the absence of an appropriate methodology may have hindered the 
establishment of minority occupational representation goals that considered the influence 
of aptitude. This need not be an obstacle today. The Assignment Model, introduced in this 
study, could certainly be adapted to this role as follows: 
• assuming that the previous year's distribution of applicants is somewhat representative 
(in tenns of its racial/ethnic makeup and aptitude) of the next year's distribution; and 
• assuming that the goa1s for the number of personnel desired for each rating next year 
are known; and 
• given established attrition rates by racial/ethnic groups; and 
• given expected ASVAB composite and cut scores, then 
an assignment a1gorithm similar to the one introduced in Chapter III could be employed to 
detennine an "expected" raciallethnic distribution for each rating. The minority 
percentages in these distributions would represent both equitable and attainable 
representation goals. 
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2. The Services must continue to validate the capability affuture ASVABforms and 
versions to predict both training perfonnance andjob perfonnance. 
The ASVAB has been shown to accurately predict performance in occupational 
training and, later, "on tbejob." [Ref. 15] Future ASVAB forms and versions must also be 
capable of predicting job performance. Only when it can be demonstrated that the ASV AB 
specifically predicts job performance with greater accuracy than other available methods, 
can its use in occupational placement overcome allegations that it discriminates with 
respect to socioeconomic status far more than justified by the requirement to support the 
Navy mission [Ref. 8.p. 81]. 
3. The Navy must ensure "cut scores" are detennined on the basis of appropriate-
qualification and not over-qualification. 
Each Service creates and applies its own aptitude composites and "cut scores." 
Cut scores are flexible over time. They are often raised or lowered based on changes in 
manpower requirements or space availability in the training pipeline. When a cut score, 
which establishes minimum qualification for occupational training, is adjusted upward 
independently of any change in the skills and abilities required by the job, the result is to 
deny less qualified persons (on the basis of aptitude) the opponunity to serve in the 
respective rating. However, the resultant redistribution affects not only the rating in 
question but the distributions of all other ratings with similar or lesser ASVAB 
requirements, Given the differentials in ASVAB performance, these changes have a 
panicularly adverse effect on minorities. The Navy must ensure that cut scores are 
established on the basis of empirically justified qualification criteria. 
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4. The Navy should maximize the PRIDE/CLASP system 10 direcl qualified 
minorities into underrepresented ratings. 
The PRIDE/CLASP automated classification and assignment program represents 
a powerful weapon to combat disproportionate minority representation in ratings. The 
CLASP model is panicularly valuabk because it was designed to be "policy-capturing," ' in 
the sense that it is able to integrate eeruin Navy policies and goals under an "optimization 
procedure." One of several policy elements that influences an "optimality index" is 
balanced minority fill rates within aU ratings IRef. 8J . The system is particularly effective 
at conveying Navy policies because it reaches each classifier directly (through the personal 
computer on their desk) and it virtually "dictates" (via the classifier) information on 
available training opportunities to the applicant. As effective as this program is, its full 
potential fo r directing minorities into disproportionately represented ratings may not bt: 
fully realized. For example, the current CLASP program provides the classifier with only 
a tllree·month listing of availabk A-school training seats for which the applicant qualifies. 
It is possible that a minority may qualify (on the basis of aptitude) for A-school rraining in 
a historically underrepresented rating; yet, because of gaps in stall dales and limited quotas, 
he or she may not be offered the A-school. If the applicant were to request the panicular A· 
school, the classifier can manually search future months until a quota is found. However. 
tilis lakes some time and it requires oven action on the pan of the classifier. If, in the case 
of minorities. the CLASP program automatically displayed A-school training dates for all 
historically underrepresented ratings fo r which the applicant qualifies. independent of time, 
there is a greater probability that the individual would choose one of these ratings. Another 
innovation involves "fencing" a number of A-school seats (corresponding 10 'fair share" 
on the basis of aptitude distribU!ions) each rraining cycle for minorities. 17 
!7Discussians with staff members at the Bureau of PcrsOllnel (PERS 22) OIl May 24. 1994 indicate that both 
recommendations are under consideration and may soon to be implemented. 
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D. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
A considerable portion of this thesis was devoted to examining the influence of 
aptitude on the distribution of black men within Navy ratings. Although blacks represent 
the largest minority population in the Navy, the factors affecting their occupational 
representation may be significantly different for other racial/ethnic groups. Accordingly, it 
is recommended that similar research be conducted to examine the influence of aptitude on 
the occupational placement of other prominent minority groups. 
As has been often noted in this study, aptitude is not the only factor exercising 
influence on occupational placement. Personal preference no doubt plays a major role in 
occupational selections by members of aU racial! ethnic groups. It may well be that personal 
preference outweighs all other considerations when a recruit selects a career field. To date, 
lime research has addressed the role of personal preference in the detennination of 
occupational distributions in the Navy. Meaningful research in this area would greatly 
contribute to the body of knowledge concerning minority occupational placement. 
E. A FINAL NOTE ON MINORITY REPRESENTATION IN U.S. NAVY 
RATINGS 
Today, military personnel managers face a fonnidable task as they seek solutions to 
the challenging issue of equimble representation for all members in Naval Service. Often, 
the Services are criticized for allowing minorities to be underrepresented in the more 
selective, highly-technical ratings and overrepresented in less-selective, least technical 
ones. Some proponents of equal opportunity correctly argue that minorities---despite 
tangible gains in past 20 years-are "forced to travel an especially rough road to complete 
job parity in the military because of the various institutional obstacles put before them." 
[Ref. 8:p. 164] These same proponents further argue that a major obstacle is, in fact, the 
aptitude test, since it is the factor upon which occupational opponunities are primarily 
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APPENDIX A: Fifth Year Demographic Data By Rating Group 
TABLE 17_ DEMOGRAPHIC DATA FOR FY1979 
Rating Assle nmenl 
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AO 243 1115 34< 69.8 30.2 88.8 11.2 
AQ 220 16 93.2 6.8 %.2 18 
AR 60 9 69 87.0 1.l.0 1ll.1 89.9 
AS 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
ASE ]1 80.6 19.4 613 
89 Y1.H 4.2 91.8 
635 53 693 '11.6 8.4 97.1 2.9 
145 1 146 Y7.9 2.1 8\.'i IX .. 'i 
Db 8 '>44 <,17.2 2.S 
:;'1 160 76.3 D.S 79.4 lO.n 
406 \39 2~.5 56.1 43.9 
786 192 978 SO.4 19.6 81.3 18.7 
219 :m 94.0 1i.0 XL'i IH.~ 
102 [13 '10.3 9.7 '15.6 44 
eM I'J 1~2 941 5.9 79.6 
C, I 50.0 50.0 lIlO.O 0,(' 
CTA 14 ]0 53 .. 1 46.7 100.0 0.0 
en 
" 
')5.7 4] ~1l.9 19.1 
CTM IX] 15 1% 92.4 7.6 96.5 ~l.5 
no 14 5R 75.9 24.1 81.0 1'1.0 
CTR 52 II 82.5 li.5 60.3 .J9.7 
CIT XI 26 107 75.7 7).7 24.:i 
6 .~o.o .'io.o 50.0 50.0 
() 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
OK 75 41 01.7 35.3 95.7 4.3 
DM 6 64.7 35.3 647 35 . .1 
DN ]fi 61.7 ~18. 3 51l.O 
236 71 307 23.1 87.9 12.1 
2 II 2 11.11 ~o.o 50.0 
DS 504 2i 331 K2 %.7 
X8 
Rating Actual Actual Assignment Model 
Number in Raling PeTGemageinRating Pen:emage in Rating 
Non-Black 
"'"" 
Total Non-Black Black Non-Black Blacl< 
DT 112 88 WO 56.0 44.0 81.0 19.0 
EA 34 2 36 94.4 5.6 100.0 0.0 
EM 890 115 1.005 88.6 11.4 93.3 6.7 
EN 432 88 520 83.1 16.9 89.6 10.4 
EO 198 2 200 99.0 1.0 'Xl.O 10.0 
ET 1,683 113 1,796 93.7 6.3 '16.6 3.4 
EW 182 20 202 90.1 9.9 95.5 4.5 
FA 42 9 51 82.4 17.6 68.6 31.4 
Fe 0 0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
FN 60 26 86 69.8 30.2 46.5 53.S 
FR 71 11 82 86.6 13.4 61.0 39.0 
FIB 81 3 84 %.4 3.6 89.3 10.7 
FTG 312 30 342 91.2 8.8 92.1 7.9 
FTM 237 15 252 94.0 6.0 %.0 4.0 
GMG 162 33 195 83.1 16.9 76.4 23.6 
GMM 59 10 69 85.5 14.5 91.3 8.7 
GMT 88 11 99 88.9 11.1 81.~ 18.2 
GSE 74 1 75 98.7 1.3 88.0 12.0 
GSM 120 2 122 98.4 1.6 97.5 2.5 
HA 9 3 75.0 2S.0 41.7 58.3 
HM 937 2SO 1,217 77.0 23.0 82.7 17.3 
HN 67 52 119 56.3 43.7 SO.4 49.6 
HR 8 2 10 SO.O 2M 30.0 70.0 
lIT 646 75 721 89.6 10.4 90.8 9.2 
1C 433 78 5ll 84.7 15.3 93.7 6.3 
1M 10 5 15 «.7 33.3 93.3 6.7 
IS 56 6 62 90.3 9.7 95.2 4.8 
10 45 7 52 86.5 13.5 100.0 0.0 
Ll 20 21 41 48.8 51.2 58.5 41.5 
LN 9 1 10 90.0 10.0 70.0 30.0 
MA 2 1 3 «.7 33.3 33.3 «.7 
ML 9 1 10 90.0 10.0 100.0 0.0 
MM 2..110 235 2.345 90.0 10.0 89.2 10.8 
MN 21 0 21 100.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 
MR 123 12 135 91.1 8.9 89.6 10.4 
MS 508 132 640 79.4 20.6 SO.6 49.4 
MT 210 7 217 96.8 3.2 86.6 13.4 
MU 12 1 13 92.3 7.7 84.6 15.4 
NC 0 0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
OM 9 0 9 100.0 0.0 88.9 11.1 
OS 318 78 396 SO.3 19.7 86.6 13.4 
QT 56 8 64 87.5 12.S 82.8 17.2 
QTA 0 0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 .0 
OTM 0 0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
PC 43 19 62 69.4 30.6 95.2 4.8 
PH 226 10 236 95.8 4.2 84.3 15.7 
PM 4 0 4 100.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 
PN 203 113 316 64.2 35.8 91.5 8.5 
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Rating ActWli Actual Assignment Mode] 
Number in Rating Percentage in Rating Per<:entage in Rating 
Non-B!ad; B1 .. Tow Non-Black 81 .. Non-Black 81 .. 
PR 97 2 99 98.0 2.0 93.9 6.1 
QM 207 38 245 84.5 15.5 58.8 41.2 
RM 518 288 8tl6 64.3 35.7 59.7 4il.3 
RP 31 6 37 83.8 16.2 100.0 0.0 
SA 73 29 102 71.6 28.4 46.1 53.9 
SH 129 136 :';5 "'.7 51.3 86.0 14.0 
SK 245 142 387 63.3 36.7 88.1 11.9 
SM 81 18 99 81.8 18.2 92.9 7.1 
SN 151 
" 
210 71.9 28.1 4il.O "].0 
S' 108 44 152 71.1 28.9 46.7 53.3 
STG 387 33 420 92.1 7.9 95.7 4.3 
STS 245 II 256 95.7 4.3 %.5 3.5 
SW 110 4 114 %.5 3.5 94.7 5.3 
TD 36 4 4il 90.0 10.0 95.0 5.0 
TM 166 80 246 67.5 32.5 87.8 12.2 
UT 101 8 109 92.7 7.3 93.6 .. 
WT 0 0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
YN 2A4 203 447 54.6 45.4 90.4 9.6 
T,,,, 20,998 4.654 25,652 
Source: Derived from data provided by the Defense M3I1power Data eemer. 
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TABLE 21. nITH YK.l.R BEMOGRAPffiC DATA: FY1982 
Rating Actual Assignment Model 
l'er,enta~e ,n RaTing P<.7<'~nta~e!n RaM" 
Nnn Tllack Black Non·Black Slac' 
AA 77.8 22.2 11.1 88.Y 
ABE 3(, 131 72.5 27.5 38.2 6LK 
57 32 89 64.0 36.0 55.1 «.9 
ABH 109 ]0 139 78.4 21.6 61.9 38.1 
AC 160 10 170 94.1 5.Y 81.2 18.8 
AD 415 51 466 89.1 10.9 82.2 17.8 
4] 457 90.6 94 78.6 21.4 
AG 3 37 91.Y 8.1 78.4 21.6 
175 52 227 77.1 22.9 1:\7.2 12.8 
AME 114 21 135 84.4 15.6 50.4 4Y.6 
AMIl 185 3] 218 ll4.9 15,1 90.8 9.2 
AMS 407 58 465 87.5 12.') N9.Y 10.1 
" '" 
29 95 69.5 30.5 38.9 61.1 
·\0 366 63 429 85.3 14.7 93.'; 6.5 
AQ 157 178 88.2 Y4.') 'U 
AR n 78.6 21.4 42.9 57,1 
AS 
" 
0.0 0.0 0.0 O.1l 
ASE 19 WI 68.] 31.7 78.3 21.7 
ASM 1IJ2 15 fl,7.2 12.8 82.1 17.4 
AT HlU 47 857 94.5 5.5 94.6 5.4 
AW 3 143 1)8.4 1.6 81.9 18.1 
AX 131 1)7.7 2] 91.6 8A 
AZ 4·' 72.2 27.8 85.2 14.8 
574 204 n!; 73.8 26.2 36.6 63.4 
BT 058 Xl 741l 88.9 11.1 77.8 22.2 
BU 2{HI 206 97.1 2.9 58.3 41.7 
CE Icc 171l ')7.6 2.4 94.1 5.9 
CM Ill!; , ')9.1 0.9 94.5 5.5 
C:..; 0 
" 
0 (J.O 0.0 0.0 OJ) 
CTA 22 4 26 M.6 1.').4 8!U lU 
CTI 53 3 56 94.6 5,4 87.5 
CTM 138 II 149 92.6 89.} 
ero 88 15 103 85.4 14.6 92.2 
CTR 96 40 136 71H, 29.4 68,4 
CIT 117 29 146 80.1 19.9 94.5 
DA I 2 50.0 50.0 50.0 
DC 0 O,{) 0.0 
DK 114 
'" 
180 63.3 36.7 81.7 
DM 9 4 13 69.2 30.8 23.1 
DK 28 15 43 65.1 37.2 
DP 234 24 258 90.7 9.3 Y1.1 
DR I 0.0 HJO.O 0.0 
DS 96.8 3.2 93.6 
DT 18 00.2 19.8 93.4 
EA 91.3 8.7 87.0 
EM 91.5 8.5 94.2 
Rating Actual 
Num~er In Rabng Percenta~e!n Ratlllg 
Ncn_Rbch RIa~k Total Non-Black Black 
423 
" 
512 XVi 17.4 90.0 
EO 162 8 170 9'i.3 75.3 24.7 
ET 2D4R M 2H2 %.1 3.9 9:;.4 4.0 
~39 
'I 260 91.9 8.1 %.2 U 
HI I 90.9 9.1 27.3 72.7 
Fe 751 81" 93.4 3.6 
~2 14 66 7ll.8 43.<1 56.1 
FR 6 24 75.0 25.0 20,S 79_2 
'8 9~_1 6.9 19.U 
145 150 96.7 3.3 95.3 4.7 
1-"1":-'1 0 0 n.o 0.0 0.0 
GMG 2·t! 50 291 82.8 17.2 
134 to 144 93.1 6.9 94.4 5.0 
GMT 
" 
9 X'-3 10.7 %.3 3.7 
GSE 101 1<}4 97.1 2.9 9'i.2 
GSM 190 2.1 94.2 5.8 
HA 2R.o 28.6 71.4 
HM 98X SO.9 19.1 91.0 
lIN 
" 
140 07.9 ,2.1 'i2.9 
7 4 II 01.6 63.6 36.4 
537 70 fJJ7 R8.5 11.5 90.0 lo,n 
Ie 352 98 450 78.2 21.8 94.9 'U 
]X 6 8M LVi 93.2 6.8 
73 3.9 86.8 13.2 
JO 35 lY R9.7 10.3 1<4.0 15.4 
Ll 01 28 71.4 2SO 40A 53.6 
LN 12 10 54,5 45.5 68.2 31), 
MA , 71.4 28.0 8'.7 
II IJ 86.7 LU 86.7 13.3 
\1"\1 1372 2541 93.3 S8.7 1l."l 
MN 20 25 80.0 20.0 92.0 8.0 
MR 14,' 167 S6.8 95.8 
621 241 Xli:'. no 28.n 71i.8 
MT 117 10 127 92_1 79 94.-' 
MU 49 51 96.1 <.9 74.5 25.5 
t\'C 0 0,0 0.0 (J.n 
OM 'I 24 87.5 12.5 9'i.8 0, 681 11() >J6.1 13.9 9O.n !OJl 
II (H) (H) 0.0 (J.n 
if> 92.4 7.6 81.8 18.2 
OTM 7 71.4 28.6 8'i.7 14.3 
55 6'i.'; ~4.'; 96.4 .1.6 
97 107 90.7 9 .. 1 94.4 5.6 
PM 6 fl.O 
PN 69 2X9 91.7 8.3 
PR 124 8 132 93.9 89.4 lO.n 
QM 253 66 319 7'U 2(1.7 74.4 25.1 
621 234 Wi7 72.7 27.1 66.3 H7 
92 
Rating Actual Actual Assignment Model 
Number in Rating Percenlaj!e ,n Ratrng Percentage in Rating 
Non·Black Black Tolal Non·Black ,- Non·BIack 
"'"" RP 35 8 43 81.4 18.6 97.7 2.3 
SA 23 19 42 54.8 45.2 71.4 28.6 
SH 104 81 185 56.2 43.8 91.4 8.6 
SK 367 166 5J3 68.9 31.1 94.4 5.6 
SM 38 180 78.9 21.1 96.7 3.3 
SN 137 82 219 62.6 37.4 713.' 21.2 
SR 33 12 45 73.3 2£,.7 0.0 0.0 
STG 344 43 387 88.9 11.1 <n.9 2.1 
STS 282 17 299 94.3 5.7 93.6 64 
SW 66 5 71 93.0 7.0 80.3 19.7 
11) 12 0 12 100.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 
TM 186 54 2AO 77.5 22.5 82.S 17.5 
UT 98 , 106 92.5 7.5 84.9 15.1 
WT 46 13 59 78.0 22.0 88.1 11.9 
YN 355 179 534 66.5 33.5 93.8 6.2 
T"'" 22.620 3.781 26.401 
Source: Derived from data provided by the Defense Manpower Dl\ta Center. 
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TABLE 23. I'IFrHYEAR DEMOGRAPIUC DATA: 1"Y1985 
Ratin!? Actual Aclual A~i!lnmeDt Model 
Numb~rinRating ~{,",'nLa~c rI Ralmg l'eTc~n~'~c in Rating 
Non-Black B1od< Total Non Black Bl""k NO'l_B.acl B1ocl< 






10' 764 2-'6 771 
';'81-' 61 ". 67.6 "A 88.8 11,2 AC n 88.9 1},1 6lA 37,6 
AD 702 15.8 78.9 21.1 





9.' 86.5 U.5 
AK 215 55 270 79.6 20.4 65.9 
'" AM' 
'"' 
3 '0' 95.3 
" 
"'.9 12,1 
AMH 2113 V 230 88.3 11,7 935 ., 
AMS 352 JJ 18') 903 9.5 91.8 82 
AN 
" 
29 73.1 26.9 41.7 3" 
AD 331 
" 
425 77.9 22.1 92.7 n 
AQ 'OS 3 no 97.1 2' 93.5 6,5 
AR S 16,7 0.0 100,0 
AS 0.0 00 00 00 
'" " " 
87.8 12.2 95.1 ,., 
ASM 70 , n 9S.6 33.8 
AJ 701 
" 













231 75,8 ~4 2 22,9 
680 21\, 969 70.2 2Y.H 17.1 
587 m 69' 16.il 2'2 
'" '" 
B ". U 22> 
" 
91 10 101 YO.I 94,1 ,., 
CM U, 9 
'" 
n.7 7.1 7E2 2" 
eN 0 0 0 (I,ll (If; Illl 0.0 
en 39 , .. S8, M' 38,6 
CT] U, 3 57.5 ,OS 
CTM 91 97 9~.S n 
CTO 69 n '.2 81.9 IS,] 







15.2 8..~_'i ]4.5 
DA 50.0 'DO 75,0 25.0 DC JJ 0.0 00 0.0 
OK 1'" 37 73.8 26,2 92.9 
OM 5 , , 83.3 16.7 100-0 00 
ON 511 V 77 "'., 35.\ 87.0 13.0 
DP au n gOO 14.0 82,6 
DR 0 , , 0.0 100.0 100.0 flO 
OS 
'" 
W 154 93.5 ,5 92.2 n 





100.0 00 '1.5 
EM lfJ()7 
"" "'" 












" 2W 239 
" '" 
':11>.5 3.' 
Rating Actual Assignment Model 
NurnberinRating PercentagemRalU1g Perwntagein RalU1g 
Non-Black Black To", Non_Black 
"'" 
Non-Black Black 
FA 5 1 . m 16.7 100.0 0.0 
Fe 980 
" 
102~ 955 '5 93.9 '.1 
FN 23 
" " 
62.2 37.8 91.9 8.1 
0 0 0.0 0.0 00 
88 
" 
94.' 5A 9~.8 
" FCG 95 10' 913 8.7 96.2 
'" FfM 0 0 0.0 00 0.0 0.0 
GMG 270 23 
'" 
78.7 21.3 72.3 27.7 
GMM 159 199 79.9 20.1 8" 15.~ 
GMT 0 0 0.0 0.0 00 0.0 
GS< 9~.9 '.1 95.4 , .. 
G5M 115 90.' 9A "'0 70 
HA 2 1 , 66.7 33.3 3B 
liM 1008 25. 
"" 
80.7 19.3 21.7 
HN 55 
" 
88 ~3.~ 36.4 19-3 
HR , 2 5 SO.O 40.0 
ill 
'" " "" 
91.~ 'A 89.5 
'" 1C 354 
" '" 





875 12.5 87.5 125 
1S 
" 
5 94 94.7 53 93.6 .A 
JO 59 1 SO 98.3 1.7 81.7 183 
L1 
" 
5 18 72.2 27.8 55.6 "., 
LN 7 778 22.2 66.7 m 
MA 
" 
875 12.5 75.0 25.0 
ML 12 n 9B 7.7 92.3 





97.0 '0 97.0 '.0 
MR m 10 
'" 





30.6 67.0 33.0 







94A ,. 51' 
0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
OM 0 100.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 
as '97 
'" ." 
713 22.7 95.5 





86.4 13.6 "'.1 15.9 








1"' 9 91.9 '.1 95.5 '.5 
PM . 0 . 100.0 0.0 83.3 16.7 
PN m 55 280 80A 19.6 85.7 14.3 
PR 94 , 98 95.9 '.1 '.1 
QM 
"" 
55 25' 78.3 21.7 49.6 
RM m 323 958 66.3 33.7 45.1 54.9 
RP 27 n 40 575 725 71.5 22.5 
5A 17 . 23 73.9 26.1 0.0 100.0 
5H 119 118 
'" 




79.1 20.9 96.7 3.3 
5M 179 51 2" 75> "., "'5 2.5 
sN 99 
" 
1<5 58.' 31.7 0.0 100.0 
SR 10 , 
" 
28' 0.0 100.0 
5<)' 
"' 
585 10.6 94.0 '.0 
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Rating Actual Assi3nment Model 
Numher m Rating Percentage in Rating Perc~ntag~in Rating 
Non·Black Black: To<o1 Non·Black Blad Non·Blad HI"" 
5T5 
"" " 





96.9 31 92.3 
" TO 0 0 0 0.0 00 0.0 
1M 119 
" 






WT .. , 71 90.1 9.9 9l.5 8.5 
YN 342 159 OIl' 31.4 '" 10.3 Total 
'"'' 
3.948 
Source: Derived from data provided by the Defense Manpower Data Centt:r. 
% 
TAHLI':24. ntTH YEAR DEMO(;RAPHlC DATA: FYI988 
RatiD~ Actual Actual A5.'Iigoment Model 
Number in Rallng Percen ... ~e in Ratll1g l'ercentageIn Ra!ing 
Non-Black Black To!al Non-Black Black Nnn-Bbck Black 
; 10 50.0 50.0 OJ) 
121 
" 
"2 41.3 58.7 
ABC W 
" 





2m 65.1 34.~ 0.0 
202 ;0 232 87.1 12.9 62.5 37.5 
,,; 
" 
5<5 17.2 335 25.5 
" 
5Il 81.7 18.~ 587 41.3 
7 7; 90S 9.2 868 13.2 
AK '"5 55 260 21.2 66.2 33.8 
AME 107 , 
" 
5; 
AMH 21' 18 m n.2 2; 
AMS 2; 527 ~5.6 'A 95.4 
" 
.<N 58 62.2 37.8 69.3 30.7 
AO 415 llS 78.3 21.7 88.5 115 
AO 0 0 00 00 00 00 
AR I ; ~1.3 
I" 58 180 21.1 9' 
ASE 0 0 0 0.0 0.0 
ASM 0 0 00 00 
A; 63 93.5 6.5 5.0 
AW 285 96.3 n 6.8 
AX 0 0.0 
AZ 182 W "2 75.1 88.4 11.6 
OM 557 356 913 61-0 39.11 806 






22 121 81.8 18.2 950 
CM 103 II 113 
"" 
9.5 78.9 21.1 





5 95.7 '.3 533 
'" 13 "I 92.8 7.2 97.2 2.8
CTO 90 II 101 89.1 93.1 69 
erR 130 
" 
I., 76.4- 23.6 958 '.2 
'9 55 89.1 10.9 94.5 5.5 
0 0 0.0 D.O 
OC "0 341 81.6 87.5 12.5 
DK 
" 
J38 68.1 95.7 
" DM I 2 ; 33.3 66.7 66.7 33.1 
34 ;; 49.3 50.7 76.8 23.2 
211 
" 
81.8 18.2 863 13.6 
UK I 0 I l00.D 0.0 100.0 
DS 19 335 94.3 57 
" DT 27 634 36.6 436 'i64 
EA 
'" " 
100.0 0.0 %A H 
EM ""7 113' 87.0 13.0 15.0 





EO 138 II I;; 89.0 11.0 85.8 14.2 
er 1585 II' 1699 93., 
" 
95.1 
" EW 31~ 2' 3.8 
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Ratiog Actual Actual Assignment Modd 
Nwnber in Rating Percenlll8einRating PercenlageinRating 
NilII-Blad .. '" T<><oJ Non-Black ''''' 
Non_Black Block 
FA 100.0 50.0 
PC 
" '" 
9~.2 93,5 0.5 
FN 
" " 
59.6 .,A 745 25.5 





95.6 4A 92.6 '-' 
Fro 154 II 185 933 0.7 91.5 '.5 
FTM 0 0 0 0.0 0.0 00 0.0 
OMO 
'" 
01 279 78.1 21.9 67.7 323 
OMM 95
" 
131 725 27.5 TI.9 22.1 
OMT 0 0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 00 
0," 157 2D 177 88.7 11.3 97.2 2' 
O'M 311 50 361 86.1 13.9 96.1 39 
HA , , 16 50.0 5O.0 75,0 25.0 
HM 1168 
'" 
145O 80.0 19.4 42.8 572 
HN 182 
'''' 
328 555 "'.5 753 24.7 
HR I 3 4 25.0 75.0 75.0 25.0 
HT m 43 414 ".0 10.4 94.7 5.3 
10 543 93 430 78.7 21.3 833 16.7 
1M 12 3 15 80.0 2"-" 86,7 13.3 
" 
75 4 79 94.9 5.1 '-' 
JO 
" 
I ., 975 2.5 ,1.0 10.0 
LI II
" 
23 47_8 52.2 100.0 0.0 
LN 10 I II 
"" 
9.1 545 45.5 
MA 16 3 
" 
84.2 15.8 57.9 42.1 
ML 10 I II "'.9 9.1 100.0 0.0 
MM 2453 219 2672 91.8 '-' 
'" 
11.2 
MN 17 0 17 100.0 0.0 94.1 59 
MR III II 122 91.0 9.0 902 9.' 
MS 050 035 12115 5O.0 49.4 33.9 00.1 





22.6 71.0 29.0 





100,0 0.0 91.7 '.3 
OS 597 167 764 78.1 21.9 92.5 7.3 
OT 0 0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
UTA 
" " 
913 '.3 63.4 36,6 
OlM 22 22 100.0 0.0 95.5 43 
PC 38 18 30 67.9 32.1 89.3 10.7 
PH 137 
" 
130 87.8 12.2 93.0 M 
PM , 0 2 100.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 
PN 163 43 2M 20.9 85.9 14.1 
PR III 7 
'" 
5.9 93.2 0.' 
OM 
'" 
33 251 78.9 49.8 5O.2 
RM 549 381 9" 59.0 41.0 34.7 ".3 
RP 23 211 51 45.1 549 37.3 62.7 
SA 12 14 26 46.2 53.8 '-IA 34.0 
SH 123 143 260 47.0 53.0 78.2 21.8 
SK 4n 
'" "" 
68.8 31.2 94.7 5.3 
SM 1'1 53 234 77.4 22.0 84.6 15.4 
SN 85 107 
'" 
",.3 357 80.7 19.3 
SR 2 , 10 20.0 80.0 70.0 30.0 








~~ ]'i 114 
C " 197 
~, 
/\ctulIl 
Sllur~e: Denn'd from lima pro,i(ku by Iht: Defense Manpower Dat;l CC~I"r 
A~signment Model 
APPENDIX C: ]992 Navy Cross-Section and 199] Civilian Equivalent 








'm 95.7 .., ,,,.,, 35,219 407.424 
" ., ",." 35,219 91.4 
















" GS ". 
, 
'" 
.. 477,946 ..~ 518.917 
"" 
,.. 
GSE '.%2 1.1iS3 
""''' 
",'" n6,517 
GSM " .. '" 






8M 15.<160 , .... 
"'" "'" '" 
,,,,..,., 
""", 1,440,249 ... , 10.7 , 
" HN 6.143 ",U 45,570 
'""" """ '" >IT ,,,,,, .. ," 89.9 1,soo,II6 141,157 1.731,273 
,e 4.755 1.335 
""" 
,.., 21.9 286,150 "...., 318.016 ~, 10.0 
" 
% 








1.641 • o" .. , 87.653 3,4119 91.143 
'" 
'" 
'u as 121.349 '2 
U 
'" 
SO, m ,., 798.276 
" .. " 
861.129 '12.7 U 
CN 
'" 





,.." 11.9 616,066 147.422 19.3 -34181 
ML 






... " MM ",0" '.003 ,..". ... , 1,161,566 89.671 1.251.236 020 '2 , ,
'" 
,., ... 432.347 
" .. " 
475.180 91.0 ,., .., 
" >OR ,,'" '" '.~ 
, .. 646,158 ",,% 696.453 ",. '2 ." , 
MS 10,63& ,,,,, 15$77 no, 3,875,Q26 4,180,177 
"" 
U 
" " 1,4113 
" 
,,,,, 93.9 "., 295.934 29,4% 325.430 
MU 
" '" '" "'" " .. " 
.,."., 8\.2 ". -61174 Ne 1,038 '00 1,2l8 " .. 16.2 ,,,,,., "".. 199,448 .M 13.6 ·1098 
'" '" 
46l,m 39,166 500,943 = 
m 
" 





...,,, OS .. 3<" 91.335 21,010 1!2.l44 81.3 '" 02m 
'" '" 






411.103 "... 443.7411 ". " 
·n , 





.. '" us 458.4119 
""'" 
494.139 ",. '2 .., , QM 
''''' '" """ 
2.811 27,035 .... 
, ... 31.4 2.112.694 116,710 2,229,404 
Rl' 
'" '" 
n. 2,127.54) 2.258.694 
'" 
,. 
SA 7.993 ,.., 21.3 ., .. \0,724 81.5 
'" 
'" 
59.9 \,678.283 02. 
" 
123 , 
2.419 9.413 74.3 3,676,545 =.~ J,932,581 U, ., 
" 
., 
, . ." 13,253 7\.3 
'" 
.. ~ , .... 10.724 
4.674 m '203 ,0" 295,934 325,430 
'.m 
'" 
93.6 .. 295.934 29,496 ~, ,., ~ 
" SW 
'" " 




























~T " 330.718 n..., 403.367 90.193.477 6,659,499 96.852.976 
S . Derived from data provided by lho DofenoeMo"""""", 0.1.0 Cad"".nd the u.s. Departmenl ofl...abo.-. B.,..,.u ofLobor 
StatiBlio;: .. Note: Civil; .... may bcooumo:! in_ thut""""'I"i\>aleln mliPg_ 
,0> 
TABLE 26. DEMOGRAPHIC DATA BYRA1lNG GROUP: 1991 NAVY CROSS·SECTIONAND 
1991 CIVILIAN EQUIVALENT 




To,," Navy Civilian Navy Civilian 
Surf eng 7,045 50.208 283,064 3,900.094 0.14 0.07 -22 
HME 5.704 39,530 525.115 6,360.446 0.14 0.08 -21) 21) 
AvmaiOl 5.&43 48,514 621.767 10,491.047 0.12 0.06 -33 -14 
Avops 4,101 19,908 185,1\68 2.123.626 0.21 0.09 14 27 
Av supply 2.113 10,207 240,557 4,Q43,934 0.21 0.06 is -13 
Adm'" 6,617 25,507 1,116,290 16.688,776 0.26 0.07 -3 
nook 3,646 15.269 133.688 1.243.674 0.24 O.ll 56 
Supply 10.023 32,166 761,894 10,716,279 0.31 0.07 73 3 
'"' 
5.194 27.088 328,257 4.387,955 0.19 0.07 6 
Oy,' 1,773 12,060 298,683 5,076359 0.15 0.06 -18 -14 
Surfops-cs 2.909 27,849 350.201 4.809,145 0.10 0.07 42 6 
Surfops 6.775 37.447 207,554 3,019.169 0.18 0.07 0 
S,b 1.383 12.165 238.389 2,713,112 0.11 0.09 -37 
oma 9,523 45,449 1.368.171 21,279.361 0.21 0.06 I' 
Source: Derived from dataprovided by the Defense Manpower Data Center and the U.S. Department 
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